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Although it is commonly believed that women are kinder and more cooperative than men, there is
conflicting evidence for this assertion. Current theories of sex differences in social behavior suggest that
it may be useful to examine in what situations men and women are likely to differ in cooperation. Here,
we derive predictions from both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on context-specific sex
differences in cooperation, and we conduct a unique meta-analytic study of 272 effect sizes—sampled
across 50 years of research—on social dilemmas to examine several potential moderators. The overall
average effect size is not statistically different from zero (d  –0.05), suggesting that men and women
do not differ in their overall amounts of cooperation. However, the association between sex and
cooperation is moderated by several key features of the social context: Male–male interactions are more
cooperative than female–female interactions (d  0.16), yet women cooperate more than men in
mixed-sex interactions (d  –0.22). In repeated interactions, men are more cooperative than women.
Women were more cooperative than men in larger groups and in more recent studies, but these
differences disappeared after statistically controlling for several study characteristics. We discuss these
results in the context of both sociocultural and evolutionary theories of sex differences, stress the need
for an integrated biosocial approach, and outline directions for future research.
Keywords: gender, sex differences, cooperation, social dilemmas, meta-analysis
Are women or men more cooperative? There is some evidence
that women, relative to men, are kinder (Conway, Pizzamiglio, &
Mount, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1984), more agreeable (Feingold,
1994), more supportive of their friends (Oswald, Clark, & Kelly,
2004), and more cooperative in same-sex work groups (Chatman
& O’Reilly, 2004). In contrast, men provide more help to strangers
in need (Eagly & Crowley, 1986), have a stronger preference for
coordinated social play as children (Benenson, Apostoleris, &
Parnass, 1997), and tend to cooperate more in larger groups
(Gabriel & Gardner, 1999).
In a seminal review of sex differences, Maccoby and Jacklin
(1974) examined the degree to which men and women differ in
a variety of social behaviors. Although they found some evi-
dence for sex differences, in most behavioral domains—
including cooperation—research findings were rather inconclu-
sive. Recent behavioral economics research comparing men’s
and women’s decisions in bargaining games (Eckel & Gross-
man, 2001; Solnick, 2001) and dictator games (Andreoni &
Vesterlund, 2001; Bolton & Katok, 1995; Dufwenberg &
Muren, 2006) also finds no systematic sex differences. Taken
together, several decades of research suggest that overall
women and men are equally cooperative.
Recent theorizing on sex differences suggests that rather than
looking for main effects, it may be more productive to investigate
the environment in which men and women make cooperative
decisions (Hyde, 2005; Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009; Weber, Ko-
pelman, & Messick, 2004). Depending on contextual factors,
sometimes women may be more cooperative, and other times men.
To investigate context-dependent sex differences in cooperation,
we use a meta-analytic approach to analyze research on experi-
mental social dilemmas, a decision environment that is highly
controlled and allows us to test some potentially important mod-
erators.
Although cooperation can be studied with a variety of methods,
including ethnographies (e.g., Mauss, 1950/1990; Mead, 1961;
Sahlins, 1972) and surveys (e.g., Major & Adams, 1983; Swap &
Rubin, 1983), the social dilemma literature uses a standard exper-
imental paradigm to investigate when and how individuals coop-
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erate (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). In social dilemmas, cooperative
motives are pitted directly against selfish motives, and individuals
must choose between these two motivations (Dawes, 1980).1 In
addition to offering an unambiguous and carefully controlled decision
situation to study cooperation, two strengths of the social dilemma
literature are its vastness—it spans over 50 years of research—and the
fact that many important contextual variables, including the size and
sex composition of the group, have been investigated. As we outline
below, these contextual variables may be crucial in determining
whether women or men are more cooperative.
The present research examines 50 years of empirical research on
social dilemmas with three primary goals in mind. First, we
provide a conclusive meta-analytic test to examine whether
women or men are more cooperative. Second, we draw insights
about potential sex differences in cooperation by utilizing two
dominant frameworks on sex differences in social behavior: the
evolutionary and the sociocultural perspective. Third, we examine
several potential moderators of sex differences in cooperation
(e.g., sex of the partner, one-shot vs. iterated interactions, group
size, and year of publication).
Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas are situations in which two or more individuals
interact with each other. Each person must decide between a
behavioral option that results in a good outcome for themselves
versus one that results in a good collective outcome (Dawes, 1980;
Kollock, 1998; Komorita & Parks, 1994). If each individual
chooses selfishly, then everyone in the group ends up with a worse
outcome than if each individual acts in the interest of the group.
The most commonly studied social dilemma is the prisoner’s
dilemma. In its most simplified version, this dilemma involves two
individuals and presents each person with two options (cooperate
or defect). If both individuals cooperate (the C-choice), each
person receives a modest monetary reward (say $10). However, if
only one person cooperates, then the defecting partner (the
D-choice) receives a large payoff (say $40), and the cooperator
receives the lowest payoff ($0)—the so-called “sucker” payoff. If
both individuals pursue their dominant strategy (to defect), then
each receives a lower payoff (say $2) than if both cooperated
($10). It is a social dilemma because each individual gains more by
defecting regardless of what the other person does, but they will
both be better off if they both cooperate rather than defect.
Social dilemmas can involve two persons or more. Extensions of
the prisoner’s dilemma to larger groups include N-person prisoners
dilemmas, public goods dilemmas (give-some games), and re-
source dilemmas (take-some games). In public goods dilemmas,
the players can decide to cooperate with each other to provide the
public good (e.g., public radio), but there is a temptation for each
to not contribute. In resource dilemmas, the players can cooperate
with each other to maintain a common resource (e.g., common
fisheries), but there is a selfish temptation for each individual to
consume as much as possible. There is much research both on
public goods (Ledyard, 1995) and resource dilemmas (Kopelman,
Weber, & Messick, 2002) that has reported the effect of sex on
cooperation, which we include in our meta-analysis.
The social dilemma paradigm has both a high internal and
external validity, which makes it very suitable for testing potential
sex differences that can be generalized across a wide range of
cooperative situations, from helping complete strangers to coop-
erating in romantic relationships and from dyadic social dilemmas
to group dilemmas. Furthermore, the social dilemma paradigm
measures actual behavior rather than hypothetical decisions or
behavioral intentions. Finally, the social dilemma literature is
vast—spanning over 50 years—and one of the most commonly
reported variables in research on social dilemmas is the partici-
pant’s sex, which makes it ideally suited for a thorough meta-
analytic review.
Sex Differences in Cooperation
In one of the earliest research on sex differences in cooperation,
Rapoport and Chammah (1965) compared male–male, female–
female, and mixed-sex dyads behavior in an iterated (repeated)
prisoner’s dilemma lasting 300 trials. They found that, on average,
the male–male pairings exhibited greater cooperation than the
mixed-sex pairings, with the female–female pairings being least
cooperative. Although this study failed to provide a convincing
explanation for these results, it nevertheless sparked a great deal of
interest in sex differences in cooperation in the late 1960s and
early 1970s (e.g., Bedell & Sistrunk, 1973; Grant & Sermant,
1969). However, there was not a clear picture emerging from these
studies (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974).
Without a clear theory to work from, social psychologists’ interest
in sex differences in cooperation waned by the 1990s. Nowadays, it is
primarily behavioral economists who study sex differences in social
dilemmas (e.g., Brown-Kruse & Hummels, 1993; Cadsby & Maynes,
1998; Mason, Phillips, & Redington, 1991; Ortmann & Tichy, 1999).
For instance, Croson and Gneezy (2009) recently provided a narrative
review of the economics literature and concluded that the results on
sex differences are inconclusive. Without doing a systematic meta-
analysis, they observed a greater variation in women’s cooperation
across studies, suggesting that women are relatively more sensitive to
the experimental context. However, they did not specify in which
situations women and men respond differentially to social dilemmas.
Thus, there is still no comprehensive picture of when sex differences
in cooperation are likely to emerge in social dilemmas and, if so, why
they are there.
A notable exception is Simpson and Van Vugt’s (2009) recent
theory arguing that men and women respond to different aspects of
1 More specifically, social dilemmas involve a conflict between altruistic
and cooperative (maximizing joint gain or equality) motives against indi-
vidualistic, competitive, and aggressive motives (Van Lange, 1999). One
prior meta-analysis examined sex differences in competition using social
dilemmas (Walters et al., 1998). However, we believe that social dilemmas
do not provide a strong test of sex differences in competitive motives
because of at least two reasons. First, most individuals are driven by either
cooperative or selfish motives during social dilemmas, with very few
individuals adopting a competitive motivational orientation (Au & Kwong,
2004). Second, even when people are placed in matrix games that isolate
competitive motives from self-interest, most everyone chooses to cooper-
ate, presumably because cooperation is now aligned with self-interest
(McClintock & McNeel, 1966). In fact, for the reasons outlined above,
researchers label behavior either cooperative or non-cooperative in social
dilemmas to avoid implying that non-cooperation was the result of being
competitive (De Dreu, 2010; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Therefore, in keep-
ing with the literature on social dilemmas, we focus on sex differences in
cooperation and not competition.
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the social dilemma. Using an evolutionary approach, they argued that
men defect primarily because they are motivated by personal greed,
whereas women defect primarily because they are motivated by the
fear of other’s defection. Because prisoner’s dilemmas, public goods
dilemmas, and resource dilemmas involve both fear and greed com-
ponents, there are no overall sex differences in cooperation showing
up, but by manipulating fear and greed separately one can expect to
find them (e.g., Simpson, 2003). Our research builds upon this idea by
focusing on whether women and men respond differently to the social
features of the social dilemma.
Theoretical Perspectives on Sex Differences in
Cooperation
There have been various theoretical advances in social psychol-
ogy in recent decades contributing to the scientific understanding
of sex differences in social behavior (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998;
Eckes & Trautner, 2000). Recent theoretical progress on under-
standing sex differences has been made primarily through both
sociocultural and evolutionary psychology theories. Each of these
major perspectives has guided research on sex differences in many
areas, including helping behavior (Eagly, 2009; Eagly & Crowley,
1986), aggression (Archer, 2004, 2009; Eagly & Steffen, 1986),
leadership styles (Eagly & Johnson, 1990), mate preferences (Ken-
rick & Keefe, 1992), and sexual strategies (Buss & Schmidt,
1993). Yet, surprisingly little research on sex differences in coop-
eration has been guided by either of these theoretical perspectives
(for exceptions, see Geary, Byrd-Craven, Haord, Vigil, & Numtee,
2003; Sell & Kuipers, 2009; Simpson & Van Vugt, 2009), and, to
our knowledge, no research has systematically compared these
perspectives. As we describe below, each perspective provides
unique insights into the origins and manifestation of sex differ-
ences in social dilemmas.
The Sociocultural Perspective
The sociocultural theory of sex differences considers different
social experiences between men and women as the origin of sex
differences in social behavior (Cross & Madson, 1997; Eagly &
Wood, 1999; Wood & Eagly, 2010). According to this perspective,
social structural aspects of society—a different distribution of men
and women in specific social roles and a gender hierarchy—are the
main contributors to sex typical social behaviors (Eagly & Wood,
1999). For instance, because men are, on average, physically
stronger and faster and because women bear the costs of pregnancy
and childcare, men and women have historically taken on different
social roles. Because of these biological differences, men and
women acquire culturally different sets of skills to fulfill the duties
of their social roles, and this affects the expectations associated
with their gender. Women are expected to assume a domestic role
(or occupational role) that involves a great deal of interpersonal
relationship skills. Accordingly, women are—or at least are per-
ceived as—more communal in orientation, less selfish, more car-
ing, friendly, and emotionally expressive (Eagly, 2009). On the
other hand, men assume social roles of high status and power and
so they are—or are perceived as—more independent, assertive,
ambitious, and dominant. As a result of different socialization
experiences, women thus develop more interpersonal skills, and
men develop more agentic skills. Moreover, women and men may
include their gender stereotype into their self-concept and self-
regulate their behavior according to these standards (Witt & Wood,
2010). Indeed, previous research has found that stereotypes of men
and women as agentic and communal, respectively, underlie many
sex differences in social behavior, especially in contexts when
these stereotypes are salient (Eagly & Wood, 2011).
What are the implications of sociocultural theory for understanding
gender differences in social dilemmas? Cooperation in a social di-
lemma, by definition, conveys a concern for the welfare of others,
which is what a communal orientation is all about (e.g., Conway et al.,
1996; Deaux & Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). In contrast, an
agentic orientation involves a concern for own outcomes over others
outcomes (A. Campbell, Muncer, & Gorman, 1993; Pruitt, 1983),
which should lead to greater defection in social dilemmas. Indeed,
there is evidence that people with a communal orientation (Balliet,
Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Probst, Carnevale, & Triandis, 1999) or
who display communally oriented behaviors cooperate more in social
dilemmas (Karremans & Van Lange, 2004; Rusbult, Verette, Whit-
ney, Slovic, & Lipkus, 1991; Van Lange et al., 1997; Van Vugt & De
Cremer, 1999). Women are expected to be more cooperative than men
in social dilemmas (e.g., Orbell, Dawes, & Schwartz-Shea, 1994),
which is consistent with gender stereotypes (e.g., Deaux & Lewis,
1984). Moreover, women are aware of these expectations in social
dilemmas (e.g., Greig & Bohnet, 2009), so this may be considered a
context when men and women may self-regulate their behavior ac-
cording to these expectations.
Although Wood and Eagly (2010) have suggested that women
should primarily display communal oriented behaviors toward
close others, there is reason to believe that the communal orien-
tation of women extends to strangers. Prior research on gender
stereotypes suggests that women are more able to devote them-
selves to others more generally (e.g., Conway et al., 1996; Deaux
& Lewis, 1984; Eagly & Steffen, 1984). Women also self-report
greater importance of universalism values than men, which sug-
gests they extend concern to others beyond close relationships
(Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Although the sociocultural view sug-
gests a main effect of sex on cooperation, gender role stereotypes
may be more or less activated in specific social contexts, and so
sex differences may only appear within these contexts (Deaux &
Major, 1987). Thus, we can examine the implications of this
perspective for context-dependent sex differences in cooperation.
The Evolutionary Perspective
Evolutionary psychology assumes that some sex differences in
social behavior result from unique—but flexible—evolved male
and female psychologies. The argument is that men and women
faced many similar adaptive problems in their ancestral environ-
ments—such as selecting food and finding a safe shelter—but they
also faced some unique adaptive problems that gave rise to sex-
differentiated physical and psychological adaptations (Buss,
1995).2 These sex-differentiated adaptations have been shaped
both by the processes of natural and sexual selection.
2 Although some researchers characterize evolved predispositions as
rigid and inflexible, they are not. Social and ecological conditions are
known to dampen or amplify the extent to which these evolved predispo-
sitions affect decision making (Flinn & Low, 1986; Geary, 2010).
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Naturally selected traits or adaptations reflect strategies to in-
crease one’s survival by dealing with challenges of the natural
environment, such as finding food and avoiding predators. Sexu-
ally selected traits or adaptations may not directly confer survival
benefits but instead help individuals to attract sexual mates (Dar-
win, 1871). Sexual selection comes about through two separate
processes. Whereas intrasexual selection involves members of the
same sex competing among one another to gain access to members
of the opposite sex, intersexual selection refers to external events
or psychological processes that cause members of one sex to
preferentially select characteristics in the opposite sex (Andersson,
1994). Both natural and sexual selection mechanisms have affected
the psychologies of men and women, sometimes resulting in
sex-typical adaptations (Geary, 2010; Geary et al., 2003).
For instance, the majority of modern day and ethnographically
recent foragers maintain a sexual division of labor where men
forage for large packaged resources through hunting, and women
target low-variance resources through gathering (Wood & Eagly,
2002). It is hypothesized that our ancestors did the same, and this
may have produced evolved sex differences in specific cognitive
abilities associated with these roles that are due to natural (Silver-
man & Eals, 1992) or sexual selection (Hawkes & Bliege Bird,
2002). Hunting requires skills related to tracking and killing ani-
mals, whereas gathering requires skills related to locating and
recalling food sources among an array of vegetation. Ancestral
men and women who were successful in these domains provided
more resources to themselves and their offspring and thus gained
a reproductive advantage. Thus, an evolutionary perspective pre-
dicts that men and women possess different psychological adap-
tations to successfully accomplish these sex-differentiated tasks.
Supporting this evolutionary hypothesis, across cultures women
outperform men in the spatial recall of objects—an ability useful
for foraging (Eals & Silverman, 1994; Silverman & Eals, 1992;
Voyer, Postma, Brake, & Imperato-McGinley, 2007), whereas
men outperform women on mental rotation tasks (Voyer, Voyer, &
Bryden, 1995)—an ability relatively more useful for hunting.
When accounting for sex differences in cooperation, the evolu-
tionary perspective assumes that women and men have evolved
different context-specific decision rules that enable each sex to
reap the benefits from interactions with other people in different
environments. That is to say, the evolutionary perspective (like the
sociocultural perspective) suggests that sex differences emerge in
response to specific environmental inputs.
Sex Differences in Cooperation: A Matter of Context?
Research on sex differences in social behavior, guided by each
of these perspectives, supports the general proposition that men
and women may respond differently in social interactions depend-
ing on specific contextual factors (Hyde, 2005). Our research fits
in with these more sophisticated models of sex differences in
social behavior by arguing that men and women show different
cooperation levels in different social decision-making environ-
ments. Although social dilemma studies are conceptually similar in
that they are all concerned with situations involving a conflict
between self-interest and the collective interest, there are several
contextual features that vary systematically between these studies
that may be correlated with sex differences. We identify several of
these in our meta-analytic review of the social dilemma literature
(e.g., sex of the interaction partner, one-shot vs. iterated dilemmas,
group size, and year of publication) and apply both theories to
advance predictions about how these moderators will impact sex
differences in cooperation.
Same-Sex Versus Mixed-Sex Interactions
Do sex differences in cooperation depend on whether interac-
tions occur among same- versus opposite-sex partner(s)? The two
perspectives make different predictions.
According to a sociocultural perspective, boys and girls spend a
significantly greater amount of time interacting with same-sex
others during childhood (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1987), and this has
resulted in distinct sex-typical modes of interactions between boys
and girls that may affect sex differences in social behavior even
during adolescence and adulthood (Maccoby, 1990). As Maccoby
(1990) has suggested, girls’ same-sex interactions tend to be more
cooperative and prosocial, whereas boys’ same-sex interactions
tend to place greater emphasis on social dominance. Thus, gender
differences in communal and agentic orientations may be partly
socialized in this context of same-sex peer relationships during
childhood (Maccoby, 1990). If so, we might expect women to
develop a particular style of interacting with other women that
makes their same-sex interactions more cooperative than among
men.
Alternatively, an evolutionarily informed hypothesis predicts
that, compared to women, men are more cooperative during same-
sex interactions. Specifically, men may have evolved a disposition
toward male-to-male cooperation and bonding because coopera-
tion with other men has had important consequences for their
survival and reproductive success (at least in ancestral times).
Specifically, two selective pressures in our ancestral environment
may have selected for male cooperation to overcome social dilem-
mas: hunting and warfare/inter-group conflict (Bowles, 2006,
2009; Foley & Lee, 1989; Geary et al., 2003; Manson & Wrang-
ham, 1991; Wrangham, 1999). The argument is that throughout
human evolutionary history, male coalitions have been an effective
strategy for men to acquire reproductively relevant resources such
as food, territory, and access to mates (Alexander, 1987; Gat,
2006; Guilaine & Zammit, 2004; Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc & Reg-
ister, 2003; Thayer, 2004; Tooby & Cosmides, 1988; Wrangham &
Peterson, 1996). Because evolutionary theorizing suggests that
men have evolved a male coalitional psychology that facilitates
male cooperation, an evolutionary hypothesis predicts that male
same-sex interactions are more cooperative than female same-sex
interactions.
What do these theories suggest about cooperation in mixed-sex
interactions? A sociocultural perspective suggests sex differences
may be more pronounced in contexts when gender stereotypes are
activated (Deaux & Major, 1987). Prior research has found that
gender stereotypes are more activated while interacting with an
opposite-sex partner (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Skrypnek & Snyder,
1982). Men and women may conform to these gender stereotypes
to avoid being negatively evaluated by others (Costrich, Feinstein,
Kidder, Marecek, & Pascale, 1975). Because women are perceived
to be more cooperative than men (e.g., Eagly & Steffen, 1984), this
stereotype may especially influence women to be more coopera-
tive than men while interacting with an opposite-sex partner,
compared to a same-sex partner (Deaux & Major, 1987). Thus,
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women are expected to be even more cooperative than men in
mixed-sex (vs. same-sex) groups.
From an evolutionary perspective, the prediction about mixed-
sex interactions is not so clear. Sexual selection theory (Buss &
Schmitt, 1993) hypothesizes that both sexes have evolved strate-
gies to signal desirable traits to potential opposite sex partners. As
in most mammalian species, women invest more resources in
producing and caring for offspring and so they might signal to
potential mates that they are kind and committed. Being the less
investing sex, men compete more heavily with each other for
mates, and they should therefore be more competitive in the
presence of women. This leads to the prediction that when inter-
acting with women, men may be motivated to signal their social
dominance and therefore should cooperate less in mixed sex
groups.
Yet, sexual selection theory also provides an argument for why
men may be especially cooperative during mixed-sex interactions.
In choosing a sexual partner, women selectively prefer men who
possess resources yet are also committed to sharing these resources
(Phillips, Barnard, Ferguson, & Reader, 2008). Thus, women also
look for cues in men that they are generous and kind, and men
might signal these prosocial qualities by making a cooperative
choice in mixed-sex interactions (Barclay, 2010; Iredale, Van
Vugt, & Dunbar, 2008). We test these different predictions by
considering whether sex differences in cooperation are moderated
by the partner’s sex.
One-Shot Versus Iterated Dilemmas
Do men and women behave differently in response to their
partner’s cooperation or defection? Studies of social dilemmas
allow participants to interact either once with each other (i.e.,
one-shot games) or repeatedly for several trials (i.e., iterated
games). If there is a difference between men’s and women’s
tendencies in the way they respond to their partner’s decisions,
then sex differences should be more pronounced across several
trials of the dilemma. We can examine this in the meta-analysis by
comparing one-shot social dilemmas with iterated social dilem-
mas.
The sociocultural perspective suggests that because women are
relatively more communal than men, women would be expected to
be more accommodating and forgiving of a partner’s defection in
a social dilemma. On the other hand, men, as a result of their
agentic roles, may possess a proclivity to exploit and dominate
and, thus, would be expected to be less forgiving and more
inclined to retaliate. This suggests that over the course of an
interaction with the same partners, women will become more
cooperative, whereas men will become less cooperative (some-
times ending up in a cycle of mutual defection).
Alternatively, according to an evolutionary perspective, men’s
survival and reproductive success were affected by their ability to
form stable cohesive groups, and this may have implications for
sex differences in response to other people’s behavior. Male
groups are maintained through dominance hierarchies (Geary,
2010). Although men may compete to acquire status within group
hierarchies, such hierarchies evolved to facilitate social cohesion
(Buss, 2005; de Waal, 2000; Hemelrijk & Gygax, 2004). Thus,
although men can fight with each other, they may be more tolerant
of defections because of the benefits of prolonged male coopera-
tion (Benenson, 2009; Geary et al., 2003). In fact, there is some
evidence that boys (and men), compared to girls (and women),
have greater tolerance for within-group interpersonal conflict
(Benenson & Christakos, 2003; Benenson et al., 2009; Fehr, Bern-
hard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Whitesell & Harter, 1996). If men are
less likely to respond to defection with subsequent defection, the
level of cooperation over time among men should be higher than
among women.
Group Size
Do men or women differ in cooperation as a function of group
size? The sociocultural perspective suggests that women find close
interpersonal relationships more important for defining their self
concept compared to men (Cross & Madson, 1997), whereas men
tend to value groups in defining their self concept (Baumeister &
Sommer, 1997)—and this perspective predicts relatively greater
male cooperation in larger groups (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). An
evolutionary perspective suggests that men should be more coop-
erative than women in larger groups, because men have more to
gain (and less to lose) from interacting with many other individuals
for the purpose of trading and warfare (Van Vugt, 2009). Thus,
both perspectives predict that men will cooperate more than
women in larger groups (e.g., N-person games). Indeed, relative to
women, men describe themselves more in terms of their group
memberships (McGuire & McGuire, 1982), have larger social
networks (Belle, 1989), and are more inclined to help a group than
a friend (Gabriel & Gardner, 1999). Our meta-analytic review is
the first to examine the possibility that sex differences in cooper-
ation are moderated by group size.
Year of Publication
Have sex differences in cooperation changed over time? Socio-
cultural theory suggests that sex differences in social behavior
change over time as gender roles change culturally (Diekman &
Eagly, 2008; Eagly & Wood, 2011; Wood & Eagly, 2010). Eagly
and Wood (2011) have argued that relatively recent societal
changes in Western culture—such as an increase in women’s
education, a declining birth rate, and less physical work—remove
obstacles for women to occupy high-status positions in society.
Such societal changes could have influenced different cooperation
rates of men and women over time. For example, there is evidence
to suggest that women have become more similar to men in terms
of their agentic (but not communal) orientation over the last 50
years (Twenge, 1997, 2001). This may reduce potential sex dif-
ferences in cooperation over time. Therefore, we examined
whether sex differences in cooperation have changed over the
course of 50 years of research on social dilemmas.
Overview of the Meta-Analysis
We conducted a meta-analytic review of sex differences in
cooperation with 272 studies on social dilemmas, covering 50
years of research with over 30,000 participants. We first examine
whether there is any overall sex difference in cooperation and then
test for possible moderators. We examine the moderators identified
above (e.g., sex of partner, iterations, group size, and year of
publication), including a few additional moderators (e.g., type of
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social dilemma and country of participants). Lastly, we consider
the possibility that sex of partner influences cooperation, that is,
we test whether people are generally more cooperative with a male
or female partner.
Method
Selection of Studies
We searched the PsycINFO database for English written articles
that contained either of the following social dilemma-related
terms: social dilemmas, prisoner’s dilemmas, public goods, or
resource dilemmas. Next, we examined abstracts to identify rele-
vant articles. We subsequently searched directly within the text of
relevant articles for gender or sex. We also searched more gener-
ally for studies using several databases in the social sciences (e.g.,
ABI/INFORM, Business Source Elite, PsycARTICLES, Social
Sciences Citation Index, Google Scholar, Sociological Abstracts,
Web of Science, Worldwide Political Science Abstracts, Disserta-
tions Online, and Econlit). We searched the entire text of English
written articles by using the terms: gender, sex, sex differences,
with cooperation, social dilemmas, prisoner’s dilemmas, public
goods, or resource dilemmas. We also searched the references of
all review articles (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Komorita &
Parks, 1994; Ledyard, 1995; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Simpson
& Van Vugt, 2009; Walters, Stuhlmacher, & Meyer, 1998; Weber
et al., 2004). Additionally, we searched the text of all articles
reported in prior meta-analyses on behavior in social dilemmas
(Balliet, 2010; Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Balliet et al.,
2009; Balliet & Van Lange, 2011; Sally, 1995). Also, we contacted
several authors who published articles on social dilemmas over the
past 5 years. Lastly, we contacted over 150 experts on social
dilemmas for unpublished data.
There were several criteria for selection. First, all studies had to
have either adolescent or adult participants. Second, all studies had
to report the biological sex of the participants. Third, only studies
using pure social dilemma paradigms were included (i.e., prison-
er’s dilemma, public good, and resource dilemma). Studies on
related economic games—such as ultimatum, dictator, negotiation,
or trust—were excluded. We coded effect sizes for studies that
either involved participants interacting with a confederate, a pre-
programmed strategy, or another participant. Importantly, in all
studies, participants believed they were interacting with other
participants. For articles with multiple studies, we coded an effect
size for each study in the article. This resulted in a total of 203
articles that contained 257 published and 15 unpublished effect
sizes (n  31,462).
Coding of Studies
We had two researchers code each article for several study
characteristics, including partner-sex, number of iterations, group
size, year of publication, type of dilemma, and country of partic-
ipants. Each variable was reliably coded (Cohen’s kappas between
.80 [number of iterations] and 1.00 [year of publication]). When
discrepancies within codings did exist, the researchers read over
each article together and were able to later agree on the coding.
This resulted in 100% agreement for each coded variable.
Same-sex or mixed-sex interactions. Social dilemmas re-
search examines behavior either in same-sex or mixed-sex dyads
or groups. Therefore, we coded whether the study examined co-
operation in same-sex interactions (k  95) or mixed-sex interac-
tions (k  145). In same-sex studies, participants were always led
to believe they were interacting with same-sex partners. However,
in mixed-sex studies, researchers did not control the sex compo-
sition of dyads or groups. These studies involve a mixture of both
same-sex and other-sex interactions. Importantly, in the mixed-sex
studies, participants would come to the laboratory in groups com-
posed of both men and women, and participants did not know who
was assigned to their dyad or group. Studies that involved hypo-
thetical scenarios (e.g., Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), observed dona-
tions to a charity (e.g., Iredale et al., 2008), or reported extensive
procedures to keep participants unaware of their partners identity
(e.g., Hartman, 1974) were coded as “other” (k  32).
One-shot or iterated dilemma. We coded whether partici-
pants either interacted in a one-shot dilemma (n  93) or an
iterated-trial dilemma (k  171). In a few studies, the results
comparing men and women were only reported for the first few
trials (k  4) or the later trials (k  1) of an iterated interaction.
We also coded the number of iterations as a continuous variable
ranging from 2 to 400 (Mode  18, Mdn  24; M  47).
Group size. We coded whether participants were either in a
dyadic social dilemma (k  144) or a dilemma involving three or
more persons (k  118). There were a few studies that asked
participants to donate to a charity or to contribute to a public good
when the number of participants in the dilemma was unknown to
the participant (k  24). These studies were excluded from the
analysis of the effect of group size on the sex–cooperation rela-
tionship. Group size was also coded as a continuous variable.
Groups ranged from two-person interactions to a 175-person
group.
Year of publication. We coded year of publication. For
unpublished data, we recorded either the date on the manuscript or
the date when the data were collected (if reported). The range of
the year of publication was 1961–2010, with the median date being
1993.
Type of dilemma. There are many types of social dilemmas,
but the most common dilemmas in the current analysis include the
prisoner’s dilemma (k 122), public goods or give-some dilemma
(k  82), and the resource or take-some dilemma (k  21). Other
dilemmas were mostly matrix games (e.g., chicken) and were
coded as a separate “other” category (k  48).
Country of participants. A total of 18 countries are repre-
sented in the sample. Most studies were conducted in the United
States (k  177), followed by the Netherlands (k  25), Canada
(k  12), England (k  11), and Japan (k  10). Other countries
represented in the sample include Belgium, Germany, India, Israel,
Kenya, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, and Taiwan.
Age, anonymity, and communication. In the current analy-
sis, most studies were conducted on students (k  247), and of the
studies that reported the average age of participants (k  31), the
average age was 24 years. Also, the majority of studies were
conducted with strangers in the laboratory (k  256), and only a
few studies were done with friends, partners, or with a protocol
that allowed individuals to choose their partner. Lastly, although
most studies in the present sample did not allow any communica-
tion between participants (k  231), there were a few studies that
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either allowed communication or manipulated communication in
the experiment (k  34).3
Overview of Analysis
We used the d value as the measure of effect size. The d value
is the difference between two means divided by the pooled stan-
dard deviation and is corrected for sample size bias (Hedges &
Olkin, 1985). The d value for each study was calculated by using
the mean difference and standard deviations for men versus
women, but when these descriptive statistics were unavailable we
calculated d by using a t score, F score, 2 value, or rates of
cooperation. When a study included a manipulated variable, we
coded the overall main effect of gender across experimental con-
ditions. Women were coded as 1, and men were coded as 2 so that
a positive d value indicates greater cooperation by men, relative to
women, whereas a negative d value is telling of greater coopera-
tion by women compared to men. All results of resource or
take-some dilemmas are reverse coded to indicate that less taking
equals greater cooperation.
Several articles reported a null relationship between sex and
cooperation, but failed to provide the statistics necessary to calcu-
late the effect size. We estimated that these studies had an effect
size of zero. This is a very conservative estimate, as several of
these articles observed a mean difference between men and
women, but lacked the statistical power to detect a small effect size
(e.g., Gallo & Sheposh, 1971; Kershenbaum & Komorita, 1970;
Mack, Auburn, & Knight, 1971; R. R. Miller, 1967; Voissem &
Sistrunk, 1971). Therefore, for all analyses, we first report the
results excluding the null findings coded as zero effect size,
followed by an additional analysis including these estimated null
findings. We report any discrepancies between the actual coded
effect sizes and those analyses including the null estimated effect
sizes.
Some studies allowed us to code several effect sizes. However,
the effect sizes may be non-independent because they share several
methodological features. Therefore, we applied Cooper’s (1998)
shifting-units-of-analysis approach to handling non-independent
effect sizes when conducting moderator analyses. Using this ap-
proach, we averaged over all the effects abstracted from a single
study that shared the same study characteristics. More specifically,
this method creates a single effect size for a study with multiple
effect sizes that share the same coding on a specific moderator. For
example, Sell, Griffith, and Wilson (1993), in a single study, report
two effects sizes based on mixed-sex interactions and one effect
size based on same-sex interactions. When conducting the mod-
erator analysis for same-sex versus mixed-sex interactions, we
averaged the two mixed-sex effect sizes to create a single mixed-
sex effect size for this study. We repeat this procedure for the other
moderator analyses.
In our analysis, we first estimate the overall effect size using a
random effects model, along with both the 95% confidence inter-
val and the 90% prediction interval. We then consider the variation
in the effect size distribution by using several indicators of heter-
ogeneity of variance (T, T2, I2, and Q). Next, we examine the
possibility that the effect size distribution contains a publication
bias. In so doing, we formally examine the distribution of studies
in a funnel plot (plotted according to their effect size and standard
error) using Egger’s regression intercept and Duval and Tweedie’s
(2000) Trim and Fill approach. Following these analyses, we then
use a mixed-effects model to conduct several univariate moderator
analyses of the effect size. We did not apply a fixed or random
effects model to these analyses because (a) we did not assume that
we had gathered all studies from the population of studies, and (b)
we did assume that there would be both systematic and random
variation in the effect size distribution. However, one limitation of
random and mixed-effects models is that they increase the chance
of Type II errors, relative to a fixed-effects model (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001). Thus, we reported any discrepancies between ran-
dom or mixed-effects analyses and a fixed-effects analysis. Anal-
yses were conducted using Hedges and Olkin’s (1985) approach
with the Comprehensive Meta-Analysis Software.
Results
Overall Analysis
Table 1 displays the distribution of effect sizes for sex differ-
ences in cooperation in a stem-and-leaf plot, whereas Table 2
presents the coding and effect size for each study included in the
meta-analysis. As shown in the stem-and-leaf plot, there is a
normal distribution of effect sizes. We found that the relationship
between sex and cooperation in social dilemmas is not statistically
different from zero (d  –0.05, 95% CI [–0.11, 0.001], 90%
prediction interval [–0.52, 0.42]). There is also variation in the true
effect size distribution (T  .29, T2  .08), and a substantial
portion of this variation may be explained by between study
differences (I2  72.54). Moreover, the effect size distribution
contains greater variation than would be expected by chance alone,
Q(175)  637.21, p  .001. Including the estimated null findings
slightly reduced the estimated overall effect size (d  –0.04, 95%
CI [–0.07, 0.000]).
It may be that the sample of studies contains a publication bias.
To examine the possibility of a publication bias, we formally
examined the funnel plot, where all studies were plotted according
to their sample size and standard error, using Duval and Tweedie’s
(2000) Trim and Fill approach. This method examines the sym-
metry of the effect size in the funnel plot and removes the most
extreme small studies from either side of the plot while recalcu-
lating the effect size at each iteration until symmetry is achieved.
In taking this approach, there were no studies filled above the
estimated effect size. However, two studies were filled below the
estimated effect size. This resulted in an estimate of a small
significant negative effect size (d  –0.06, 95% CI [–0.12,
–0.001]). Moreover, Egger’s regression analysis resulted in a
non-significant intercept: Intercept  .09, t(174)  0.29, p  .77,
3 Although we include these codings primarily to describe our data set,
we did analyze these variables as potential moderators of the effects size.
We did not find age, stranger, or communication to significantly moderate
the sex–cooperation relationship. However, there is restriction in range of
the age variable. Additionally, for the studies that were coded as using
communication, the effect sizes were coded by averaging over both non-
communication and communication conditions, and therefore this may
have diluted any possible sex differences. Therefore, these analyses are
limited, and future research is still encouraged to examine how age,
communication, and the type of relationship may moderate sex differences
in cooperation.
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which indicates an absence of bias in the data. Taken together,
these analyses suggest that a publication bias is absent in our data.
We note, however, that the conclusions derived from the above
random-effects estimate differ from the result of the fixed-effects
analysis. Using a fixed-effects analysis, we found that women
were significantly more cooperative than men (d –0.04, 95% CI
[–0.06, –0.02]). However, this is an exceptionally small effect
size, and the analysis may have resulted in a Type I error. Addi-
tionally, we do not have all the studies in the population of studies,
which violates an assumption of a fixed-effects analysis. Thus, we
conclude that there is no meaningful overall sex difference in
cooperation.
Moderators
In the following section, we first conduct a series of univariate
moderator analyses. For each moderator, we first examine the
effect with only the coded effect sizes and then an additional
analysis including the null findings that were estimated to be zero.
After reporting the univariate tests, we report the correlations
among some of the moderating variables and conduct a multiple
regression model predicting the effect size.
Same-sex versus mixed-sex interactions. The results of the
categorical moderator analyses are presented in Table 3. There is
a statistically significant difference between the effect size esti-
mates in the mixed-sex studies compared to the same-sex studies,
Q(1)  41.16, p  .001. During mixed-sex interactions, women
were more cooperative than men (d  –0.22, 95% CI [–0.29,
–0.15]). However, during same-sex interactions, men were more
cooperative than women (d  0.16, 95% CI [0.06, 0.25]). For
many of the studies coded as mixed-sex dilemmas, researchers did
not control for the sex of participants. In these studies, several
individuals (strangers) came to the laboratory to participate in a
social dilemma. As such, it is likely that some of these data contain
interactions that are based on same-sex groups. Based on this
concern, we conducted a separate analysis only on dyadic inter-
actions, where we can be more certain that studies labeled as
mixed-sex are indeed heterogeneous on sex. For dyadic, mixed-sex
interactions, women were more cooperative than men (d  –0.30,
95% CI [–0.39, –0.21]), whereas for dyadic same-sex interactions,
men were more cooperative than women (d  0.22, 95% CI [0.12,
0.33]), Q(1)  53.83, p  .001. As displayed in Table 3, these
conclusions do not change after introducing the null findings into
the analysis.4
Single versus repeated interactions. We used the number of
iterations as a continuous variable predicting the effect size in a
meta-regression. In the overall sample, we found a statistically
significant positive slope, b  .003, Q(1)  21.10, p  .001,
indicating that men, compared to women, tended to become more
cooperative as iterations continued. To rule out the possibility that
this was due to greater cooperation by women than men in one-
shot interactions, we also examined this relationship excluding
one-shot interactions. When we considered just the iterated inter-
actions, there was still a significant positive effect of the number
of iterations, b  .002, Q(1)  12.05, p  .001. According to the
overall analysis, the estimated effect size of the sex–cooperation
relationship at 100, 200, and 300 iterations is d  0.13, 0.38, and
0.63, respectively. Including the null findings in this analysis does
not eliminate the effect of iterations on the sex–cooperation rela-
tionship. Therefore, these results suggest that as people interact
during repeated social dilemmas, over time men become increas-
ingly more cooperative than women.
Group size. We coded group size as a continuous variable
and used meta-regression with group size predicting the effect size
distribution. Group size had a negative relationship with the sex–
cooperation effect size, b  –.02, Q(1)  4.00, p  .045. This
conclusion remains the same when including the null effect studies
in the analysis.
Year of publication. We coded year of publication as a
continuous variable and used meta-regression to examine its effect
on the sex–cooperation relationship. The analysis indicated a
4 We also examined whether partner gender moderated the sex–
cooperation effect size in each of the separate social dilemma categories.
We found a similar pattern across both the prisoner’s dilemma and the
“other’ category”: Men were more cooperative in same-sex interactions,
but women were more cooperative in mixed-sex interactions. However, for
public goods dilemmas, the nine same-sex studies (d  –0.07) did not
differ from the 33 mixed-sex studies (d  –0.06). Unfortunately, the
resource dilemmas only included mixed-sex studies.
Table 1
Stem-and-Leaf Diagram of the Overall Distribution of Effect
Sizes for Sex Differences in Cooperation
d value 0.1 units of the d value
1.5 3
1.4
1.3 0
1.2
1.1 4 8
1.0
0.9 8
0.8 0 6
0.7 0 0 0 3 5 5 7 8
0.6 0 5 7 9
0.5 0 2 3 3 4 5 7 7
0.4 0 0 7 7 7 9 9
0.3 0 1 3 5 5 6 6 8
0.2 0 0 0 2 3 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 9
0.1 0 0 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 6
0.0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 3 4 5 5 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 9 9
0.1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 9 9
0.2 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 6 7 8 8
0.3 0 0 1 1 2 4 5 6 6 6 7 7
0.4 0 3 3 3 5 6 6 6 7 7
0.5 0 0 1 2 3 5 6 6 7 7
0.6 0 0 1 2 3 5 8
0.7 2 5 6 6
0.8 5 7
0.9 2 4 4 8
1.0 4
1.1 7
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5 3
Note. This plot omits three outliers: 1.65, 1.76, and 1.90. This plot
only includes the 176 effect sizes that were coded and does not include the
null effect studies that were estimated to have zero effect size.
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Table 2
Studies Included in the Meta-Analysis
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Ahmed (2008) 180 SE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.21 0.50, 0.09
Alcock & Mansell (1977) 60 CA PD MIXED 10 IT(30) 0.11 0.70, 0.46
Andersen et al. (2008) 80 IN PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.20 0.64, 0.24
Study 2 51 IN PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.61 1.68, 0.01
Study 3 61 IN PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.21 0.71, 0.70
Andreoni & Petrie (2008) 80 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(40) 0.29 0.15, 0.73
Ando (1999) 36 JP PGD MIXED 9 IT(3) 0.00 0.68, 0.68
Anthony & Horne (2003) 298 US O MIXED 6 N/A 0.43 0.66, 0.20
Aranoff & Tedeschi (1968) 216 US PD SAME 2 IT(200) 0.00 0.27, 0.27
Baker & Rachlin (2001) 48 US PD N/A N/A IT(100) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Study 2 48 US PD N/A N/A IT(100) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Study 3 48 US PD MIXED 2 IT(100) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Balliet (2009) 55 SG PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.09 0.63, 0.46
Batson et al. (1995) 120 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(2) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Study 2 45 US PGD SAME 4 IT(2) 0.00 0.61, 0.61
W. M. Becker & Miles (1978) 297 US O MIXED 2 OS 0.87 1.12, 0.62
Bedell & Sistrunk (1973) 60 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.70 0.18, 1.22
Belianin & Novarese (2005) 24 RU PGD MIXED 6 IT(12) 1.90 2.87, 0.93
Belot et al. (2006) 138 NL PD MIXED 2 OS 0.43 0.80, 0.05
Belot et al. (2010) 138 NL PD MIXED 2 OS 0.33 0.67, 0.001
Bixenstine et al. (1964) 64 US O SAME 2 IT(160) 0.28 0.26, 0.83
Bixenstine & Garebelein (1971) 100 US PD SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.40, 0.40
Bixenstine & O’Reilly (1966) 80 US PD SAME 2 IT(60) 0.54 0.09, 0.98
Bixenstine et al. (1963) 48 US PD SAME 2 IT(30/90) 0.05 0.52, 0.61
Bixenstine & Wilson (1963) 80 US PD SAME 2 IT(190) 0.00 0.45, 0.45
Black & Higbee (1973) 72 US O SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Bonacich (1972) 120 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(5) 0.30 0.79, 0.20
Boone et al. (1999) 40 NL PD MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.64, 0.64
Boone et al. (2010) 112 BE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.13 0.50, 0.23
Brickman et al. (1979) 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 0.08 0.69, 0.53
Sample b 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 0.65 0.03, 1.27
Sample c 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 1.53 0.85, 2.22
Sample d 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 0.94 1.57, 0.30
Sample e 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 1.53 2.22, 0.84
Sample f 42 US PD SAME 2 IT(18) 1.14 0.49, 1.79
A. Brown (2006) 61 US TS MIXED 4 OS 0.20 0.74, 0.33
A. Brown & Stasser (2004) 41 US TS MIXED 4 OS 0.72 1.37, 0.07
K. M. Brown & Taylor (2000) 242 US PGD N/A N/A OS 0.26 0.00, 0.51
Study 2 242 US PGD N/A N/A OS 0.33 0.07, 0.58
Brown-Kruse & Hummels (1993) 64 US PGD SAME 4 IT(6) .50 0.00, 1.00
Buchan et al. (2009) 1,029 N/A PGD MIXED 12 IT 0.04 0.16, 0.08
Cadsby et al. (2007) 160 CA/JP PGD SAME 10 IT(25) 0.14 0.45, 0.17
Cadsby & Maynes (1998) 220 CA PGD SAME 10 IT(1/25) 0.23 0.49, 0.04
Caldwell (1976) 130 US PD SAME 5 IT(80) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
W. K. Campbell et al. (2005) 232 US TS MIXED 4 IT(25) 0.36 0.63, 0.09
Study 2 166 US TS MIXED 4 IT(25) 0.32 0.64, 0.001
Carment (1974) 66 CA O SAME 2 IT(100) 0.31 0.24, 0.87
Charness & Rustichini (2010) 160 US PD SAME 2 OS 0.01 0.26, 0.24
Study 2 74 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.23 0.61, 0.12
M. L. Clark (1983) 40 US PD MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.96 0.29, 2.83
Sample 2 40 US PD MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.70 1.33, 2.14
K. Clark & Sefton (2001) 120 UK PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Cohen et al. (2010) 172 US PD SAME 2 OS 0.02 0.32, 0.28
Study 2 130 US PD SAME 2 OS 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Conrath (1972) 84 US O SAME 4–6 IT(32) 0.10 0.19, 0.02
Corfman & Lehmann (1994) 227 US PD N/A 2 OS 0.47 0.74, 0.20
Croson et al. (2008) 150 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(25 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Crowne (1966) 34 US PD SAME 2 IT(20) 0.80 0.12, 1.50
Dawes et al. (1977) 284 US O MIXED 8 OS 0.17 0.42, 0.08
Study 2 160 US O MIXED 8 OS 0.30 0.62, 0.01
Declerck et al. (2010) 131 BE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.10 0.45, 0.24
Study 2 128 BE PD MIXED 2 OS 0.15 0.51, 0.19
(table continues)
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Table 2 (continued)
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
De Cremer & Van Dijk (2009) 148 NL PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.00 0.33, 0.33
Study 2 114 NL PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.00 0.37, 0.37
Study 3 110 NL PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.00 0.38, 0.38
Dolbear et al. (1969) 46 US PD MIXED 2 N/A 0.00 0.60, 0.60
Drouvelis et al. (2010) 54 UK PGD MIXED 3 OS 0.55 0.47, 0.16
Eek & Biel (2003) 68 SE PGD MIXED 4 IT(33) 0.00 0.49, 0.49
Enzle et al. (1992) 134 CA PD MIXED 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.34, 0.34
Evans & Crumbaugh (1966) 20 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.20 0.81, 1.20
Farrelly et al. (2007) 231 UK PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.26, 0.26
Ferguson & Schmitt (1988) 40 US PD SAME 2 IT(30) 0.12 0.84, 0.60
Ferrin et al. (2008) 68 US PD SAME 2 IT(3) 0.10 0.38, 0.57
Study 2 68 US PD SAME 3 IT(3) 0.40 0.08, 0.88
Fisher & Smith (1969) 120 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.46 0.98, 0.05
Fleishman (1988) 170 US PGD SAME 5 IT(5) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Fox & Guyer (1978) 80 CA PD SAME 4 IT(30) 0.05 0.67, 0.57
Frank et al. (1993) 207 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.52 0.81, 0.25
Fundenberg et al. (2010) 274 US PD MIXED 2 IT(8) 0.40 0.64, 0.16
Gabriel & Gardner (1999) 137 US PGD N/A N/A OS 0.25 0.08, 0.59
Study 2 137 US O N/A 2 OS 0.35 0.69, 0.01
Gallo et al. (1969) 20 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.15 0.98, 1.28
Gallo & Sheposh (1971) 120 US PD SAME 2 IT(20) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Garza & Borchert (1990) 84 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(20) 0.46 0.89, 0.03
Gillis & Woods (1971) 98 CA PD N/A 2 IT(20) 0.46 0.86, 0.06
Goehring & Kahan (1976) 60 US PD SAME 3 IT(150) 0.03 0.48, 0.53
Granberg & Stevens (1975) 96 US O SAME 2 IT(60) 0.30 0.10, 0.70
Grant & Sermat (1969) 48 CA O MIXED 2 IT(60) 0.00 0.57, 0.57
Greig & Bohnet (2009) 270 KE PGD MIXED 4 OS 0.22 0.08, 0.51
Hamburger et al. (1975) 160 US PD SAME 5 IT(150) 0.00 0.31, 0.31
Hardy & van Vugt (2006) 62 UK PGD MIXED 3 IT(25) 0.49 0.02, 0.99
Hartman (1974) 128 US PD N/A 2 IT(50/100) 0.09 0.30, 0.47
Hartman (1980) 128 US PD SAME 2 IT(25) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
Hemesath & Pomponio (1998) 30 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.59 1.33, 0.13
Holm (2000) 87 SE O SAME 2 IT(2) 0.35 0.15, 0.84
Sample b 58 SE O MIXED 2 IT(2) 0.76 1.42, 0.10
Study 2 85 SE O SAME 2 IT(2) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Sample b 86 SE O MIXED 2 IT(2) 0.98 1.50, 0.46
Study 3 40 US O SAME 2 IT(2) 0.07 0.43, 0.50
Sample b 86 US O MIXED 2 IT(2) 0.76 1.33, 0.22
Hopthrow et al. (2007) 158 UK PD MIXED 4 IT(4) 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Horai & Tedeschi (1969) 90 US PD SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Horai & Tedeschi (1975) 60 US PD MIXED 2 IT(60) 0.00 0.52, 0.52
Hottes & Kahn (1974) 60 US PD SAME 2 IT(180) 0.86 0.33, 1.38
Hu & Liu (2003) 255 TW PD MIXED 2 OS 0.47 0.73, 0.22
Huntoon (2006) 333 US PGD MIXED 5 OS 0.02 0.20, 0.24
Insko et al. (1987) 260 US O MIXED N/A IT(10) 0.00 0.25, 0.25
Insko et al. (1993) 77 US O SAME N/A OS 0.00 0.46, 0.46
Insko et al. (2005) 292 US O SAME N/A OS 0.00 0.23, 0.23
Study 2 258 US O SAME N/A OS 0.00 0.26, 0.26
Iredale et al. (2008) 30 UK PGD N/A N/A OS 0.26 1.00, 0.49
Jackson (2001) 200 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.00 0.28, 0.28
Jackson (2008) 66 US PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.00 0.49, 0.49
James et al. (2001) 33 CA PD MIXED 3 OS 1.17 1.95, 0.39
Jaster & Arrow (2010) 324 US PGD MIXED N/A IT(6) 0.20 0.42, 0.03
Kahn et al. (1971) 40 US PD SAME 2 IT(75) 0.00 0.64, 0.64
Study 2 80 US PD SAME 2 IT(75) 0.00 0.45, 0.45
Kamas et al. (2008) 162 US PGD MIXED N/A OS 0.62 0.94, 0.31
Kanouse & Wiest (1967) 187 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.13 0.43, 0.15
Kennelly & Fantino (2007) 238 US O N/A 2 IT(20) 0.38 0.05, 0.70
Study 2 156 US O N/A 2 IT(20) 0.36 0.04, 0.68
Kershenbaum & Komorita (1970) 96 US PD SAME 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Kiesler et al. (1996) 86 US PD N/A 2 IT(6) 0.00 0.43, 0.43
Knight (1980) 96 US PD MIXED 2 IT(100) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Komorita (1965) 74 US PD SAME 2 IT(80) 0.73 1.10, 0.02
Study 2 54 US PD SAME 2 IT(80) 0.56 1.10, 0.02
Komorita & Mechling (1967) 64 US PD SAME 2 IT(4/10) 0.00 0.50, 0.50
Kortenkamp & Moore (2006) 112 US TS MIXED N/A OS 0.65 1.07, 0.23
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Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Kramer & Brewer (1984) 58 US TS MIXED 6 IT(12) 0.00 0.53, 0.53
Study 2 48 US TS MIXED 6 IT(24) 0.00 0.58, 0.58
Study 3 66 US TS MIXED 6 IT(24) 0.00 0.49, 0.49
Kube & Traxler (2009) 96 DE PGD MIXED 4 IT(11) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Kuhlman & Marshello (1975) 167 US PD SAME 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.31, 0.31
Ku¨mmerli et al. (2007) 30 CH PD MIXED 2 IT(12) 1.04 1.84, 0.24
Kurzban (2001) 57 US PGD SAME 6 IT(10) 0.10 0.33, 0.13
Kurzban & Houser (2001) 72 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(15) 0.47 0.96, 1.91
Kuwabara (2005) 122 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.11 0.29, 0.51
Lacy (1978) 236 US PD SAME 2 IT(1/20) 0.11 0.42, 0.20
Liebrand (1984) 261 NL TS MIXED 7 IT(5) 0.36 0.70, 0.01
Study 2 132 NL TS MIXED 20 IT(5) 0.62 1.03, .22
Liebrand & Van Run (1985) 270 US/NL TS MIXED 6–7 IT(5) 0.31 0.55, 0.06
Lindskold et al. (1986) 128 US PD SAME 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
Study 2 57 US PD SAME 2 IT(40) 0.00 0.53, 0.53
Lindskold et al. (1977) 54 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.31 0.59, 0.03
Sample b 135 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.00 0.34, 0.34
Study 2 168 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.00 0.31, 0.31
List (2006) 134 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.24 0.53, 0.04
Lutzker (1961) 40 US O MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.12, 0.13
Mack et al. (1971) 48 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.78 0.19, 1.36
Mack et al. (1979) 20 UK PD N/A 2 IT(100) 1.75 2.79, 0.72
Majolo et al. (2006) 20 UK PD SAME 2 IT(15) 0.00 0.95, 0.95
Marwell et al. (1971) 32 US O SAME 2 IT(12) 0.75 0.07, 1.57
Study 2 22 US O SAME 2 IT(12) 1.65 0.68, 2.62
Mason et al. (1991) 82 US O MIXED 2 IT(25) 0.23 0.69, 0.23
McCallum et al. (1985) 180 US PD SAME 2 IT(10) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Study 2 124 US O SAME 4 IT(10) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
McClintock et al. (1965) 36 US O SAME 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.68, 0.68
McClintock & Liebrand (1988) 129 US PD MIXED 2 IT(30) 0.00 0.35, 0.35
McKeown et al. (1967) 60 US O MIXED 2 IT(100) 0.00 0.52, 0.52
McNeel et al. (1972) 96 BE O SAME 2 IT(100) 0.21 0.61, 0.19
Meeker (1984) 18 US PD SAME 2 IT(400) 1.30 0.26, 2.34
Meier (2005) 532 CH PGD N/A N/A OS 0.27 0.10, 0.44
Meux (1973) 170 US O MIXED 12 IT(50) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Miermin (1976) 90 US O SAME 3 IT(30) 0.16 0.10, 0.23
R. R. Miller (1967) 120 US O SAME 2 IT(25) 0.00 0.36, 0.36
G. H. Miller & Pyke (1973) 82 CA O MIXED 2 IT 0.60 1.05, 0.16
Millet & Dewitte (2007) 173 BE PGD MIXED 4 IT(3) 0.00 0.30, 0.30
Mitani & Flores (2007) 45 JP PGD MIXED 5 IT(10) 0.50 1.10, 0.09
L. B. Mulder (2008) 114 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.08 0.41, 0.88
L. B. Mulder (2010) 50 NL TS N/A 4 OS 0.11 0.68, 0.46
L. B. Mulder & Nelissen (2010) 133 NL TS MIXED N/A OS 0.16 0.51, 0.18
Study 2 119 NL TS MIXED N/A OS 0.28 0.66, 0.10
L. B. Mulder et al. (2006a) 50 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.13 0.79, 0.51
Study 2 113 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.53 0.16, 0.91
Study 3 100 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.16 0.25, 0.56
L. B. Mulder et al. (2006b) 52 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.41 0.14, 0.95
Study 2 78 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.20 0.25, 0.64
L. B. Mulder et al. (2009) 36 NL PGD N/A 4 OS 0.35 0.31, 1.01
Murnighan & Roth (1983) 252 US PD MIXED 2 N/A 0.00 0.25, 0.25
Nowell & Tinkler (1994) 44 US PGD SAME 4 IT(13) 0.75 1.98, 0.45
Oberholzer-Gee et al. (2010) 188 NL O MIXED 3 OS 0.15 0.47, 0.16
Oda (1997) 70 JP PD MIXED 2 OS 0.16 0.64, 0.32
Orbell et al. (1994) 108 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.19 0.59, 0.22
Study 2 68 US PD MIXED 2 OS† 0.10 0.57, 0.36
Ortmann & Tichy (1999) 96 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.27 0.44, 0.09
Orwant & Orwant (1970) 165 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.28 0.60, 0.04
Oskamp & Kleinke (1970) 100 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.57 0.18, 0.58
Oskamp & Perlaman (1965) 32 US PD SAME 2 IT(30) 1.18 0.43, 1.93
Patterson & Boles (1974) 72 US PD MIXED 2 IT(16) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Perugini et al. (2005) 108 DE PGD MIXED 3 IT(10) 0.43 0.82, 0.05
Pilisuk et al. (1968) 176 US PD MIXED 2 IT(25) 0.08 0.24, 0.39
Poppe (2005) 91 US PGD MIXED 175 IT(9) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Poppe & Utens (1986) 90 NL TS MIXED 6 IT(16) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Pruitt (1967) 100 US O SAME 2 IT(1/20) 0.69 0.23, 1.15
Putterman et al. (2010) 80 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(24) 0.00 0.45, 0.45
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Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Rapoport (1988) 69 CA PD MIXED 2 OS 0.03 0.03,0.45
Rapoport & Chammah (1965) 140 US PD SAME 2 IT(300) 0.57 0.19, 0.94
Reich & Purbhoo (1975) 57 CA PD MIXED 2 IT(50) 0.00 0.53, 0.53
Rooney et al. (2005) 1,409 US PGD N/A N/A N/A 0.20 0.31, 0.10
Ruffle & Sosis (2007) 212 IL TS N/A 2 OS 0.23 0.04, 0.50
Sanna et al. (2003) 110 US TS MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.38, 0.38
Study 2 83 US TS MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.44, 0.44
Study 3 75 US PD MIXED 2 IT(10) 0.00 .46, 0.46
Study 4 94 US TS MIXED 2 IT(5) 0.00 0.41, .041
Seguino et al. (1996) 139 US PGD MIXED 5–52 OS 0.51 0.87, 0.17
Sell (1997) 82 US PGD N/A 4 IT(18) 0.25 0.18, .067
Study 1b 83 US PGD SAME 4 IT(18) 0.45 .88, .10
Study 1c 79 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.47 0.02, 0.92
Sell et al. (1993) 22 US PGD N/A 4 IT(18) 0.09 0.92, 0.75
Study 1b 26 US PGD SAME 4 IT(18) 0.55 0.23, 1.33
Study 1c 25 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.52 0.28, 1.32
Study 1d 26 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.15 0.92, 0.63
Study 2 25 US PGD N/A 4 IT(18) 0.53 0.27, 1.33
Study 2b 26 US PGD SAME 4 IT(18) 0.70 0.10, 1.49
Study 2c 25 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.98 0.15, 1.82
Study 2d 30 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(18) 0.63 0.08, 1.42
Sell & Wilson (2001) 96 US PGD MIXED 4 IT(10) 0.49 0.06, 0.93
Sermat (1967) 32 US O SAME 2 IT(200) 0.26 0.20, 0.31
Setzman (1974) 40 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.11 0.83, 0.61
Sheldon (1999) 90 US PD MIXED 2 IT(15) 0.00 0.42, 0.42
Sheldon & McGregor (2000) 80 US TS N/A 4 OS 0.00 0.45, 0.45
Study 2 152 US TS MIXED 4 IT(N/A) 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Shinada & Yamagishi (2007) 157 JP PD MIXED 3 OS 0.00 0.32, 0.32
Study 2 144 JP PD MIXED 3 OS 0.00 0.33, 0.33
Shomer et al. (1966) 64 US O SAME 2 IT(15) 0.60 0.10, 1.10
Sibley et al. (1968) 24 US PD SAME 2 IT(100) 0.84 1.68, 0.01
Simpson (2003) 82 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.49, 0.49
Study 2 70 US PD MIXED 2 OS 0.14 0.39, 0.67
Simpson & Macy (2004) 114 US O MIXED 4 IT(15) 0.00 0.37, 0.37
Skotko et al. (1974) 134 US PD SAME 2 IT(50) 0.36 0.02, 0.70
Small & Loewenstein (2005) 140 US PGD MIXED 10 OS 0.00 0.34, 0.34
E. R. Smith et al. (2003) 143 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.13 0.20, 0.46
Study 2 209 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.10 0.17, 0.37
Study 3 155 US PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.06 0.26, 0.39
N. S. Smith et al. (1975) 96 US PD MIXED 2 IT(60) 0.50 1.08, 0.07
Solow & Krikwood (2002) 125 US PGD MIXED 5 IT(10) 0.47 0.11, 0.82
Speer (1972) 60 US PD MIXED 2 IT(75) 0.11 0.04, 0.17
Steele & Tedeschi (1967) 84 US O SAME 2 IT(300) 0.75 0.28, 1.21
Study 2 84 US O SAME 2 IT(300) 0.00 0.44, 0.44
Stockard et al. (1988) 594 US/CA PGD MIXED 9 OS 0.08 0.54, 0.39
Study 2 100 US/CA PGD MIXED 7 OS 0.23 0.67, 0.21
Surbey & McNally (1997) 150 CA PD MIXED 2 OS 0.36 0.69, 0.04
Swingle (1970) 60 US O SAME 2 IT(150) 0.00 0.52, 0.52
Swope et al. (2008) 48 US PD N/A 2 OS 0.07 0.75, 0.62
Takahashi et al. (2006) 99 JP PD MIXED 2 OS 0.07 0.46, 0.33
Tedeschi et al. (1970) 30 US PD MIXED 2 IT(150) 0.92 1.67, 0.17
Tedeschi et al. (1968) 64 US PD MIXED 2 IT(10) 0.50 1.00, 0.01
Tedeschi et al. (1969) 50 US PD MIXED 2 IT(20) 0.68 1.25, 0.11
Van Egeren (1979) 16 US PD SAME 2 IT(45) 0.12 0.00, 0.23
Study 2 16 US PD SAME 2 IT(45) 0.05 0.07, 0.12
Van Lange (1999) 196 NL PD MIXED 2 OS 0.00 0.28, 0.28
Van Vugt et al. (2007) 93 UK PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.37 0.79, 0.05
Study 2 120 UK PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.26 0.10, 0.63
Study 3 90 UK PGD MIXED 6 IT(6) 0.57 1.00, 0.13
Vinacke et al. (1974) 144 US PD SAME 3 IT(10) 0.74 1.08, 0.40
Voissem & Sistrunk (1971) 96 US PD SAME 2 IT(101) 0.00 0.41, 0.41
Wiley (1973) 64 US PD SAME 2 IT(20) 0.04 0.17, 0.07
Willer (2009) 72 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(5) 0.00 0.47, 0.47
Study 2 41 US PGD MIXED 6 OS 0.00 0.64, 0.64
Study 3 97 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(10) 0.00 0.40, 0.40
Study 4 86 US PGD MIXED 6 IT(5) 0.00 0.43, 0.43
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statistically significant negative relationship between year of pub-
lication and the effect size, b  –.005, Q(1)  6.30, p  .01. This
continued to be significant after including the null findings. This
result indicates that sex differences in cooperation significantly
diminished over time. Specifically, the tendency for men to be
more cooperative than women during the 1960s has significantly
diminished, if not reversed. To illustrate, in studies conducted
between 1960 and 1975, men were slightly more cooperative than
women (d  0.11), but between 1976 and 1999 and between 2000
to 2010, women were more cooperative than men (d  –0.12, and
d  –0.09, respectively).
Type of dilemma. We found a statistical difference between
the three types of dilemmas, Q(2)  11.96, p  .003. First, there
was no sex difference in the public goods dilemma (d 0.01, 95%
CI [–0.08, 0.10]). Second, women were marginally more cooper-
ative than men in the prisoner’s dilemma (d  –0.08, 95% CI
[–0.16, 0.007]). However, women displayed a statistically greater
amount of cooperation than men in the resource dilemma (d 
–0.30, 95% CI [–0.45, –0.14]). As displayed in Table 3, including
the null effects did not change the qualitative conclusions of this
analysis.
Country of participants. We examined whether there were
any differences between countries that were represented by at least
seven studies in the sample. There were no statistically significant
difference between countries, Q(4)  8.61, p  .07. As displayed
in Table 3, men and women displayed equal levels of cooperation
in the United States, Netherlands, Japan, and England. However,
women were more cooperative than men in Canada (d  –0.26,
95% CI [–0.45, –0.06]). The comparison between Canada and the
United States is significant, Q(1)  5.51, p  .02. These findings
were the same after including the null results in the analysis.
Multiple regression model. It could be that gender compo-
sition and iterations predict the sex–cooperation effect size be-
cause these variables are confounded with other methodological
features. In fact, as displayed in Table 4, gender composition has
a significant correlation with the number of iterations, year of
publication, and the type of dilemma. Number of iterations is also
correlated with the year of publication. To examine whether gen-
Table 2 (continued)
Study N CO DV SAME/MIXED GS OS/IT d LL, UL
Wit & Kerr (2002) 60 US O N/A 6 OS 0.00 0.52, 0.52
Study 2 120 US O N/A 6 OS 0.00 0.36, 0.36
Study 3 100 US O N/A 6 OS 0.00 0.40, 0.40
Wit & Wilke (1992) 570 NL PGD MIXED 100 OS 0.00 0.17, 0.17
Wit & Wilke (1998) 104 NL PGD N/A 100 OS 0.00 0.39, 0.39
Yamagishi (1986) 192 JP PGD SAME 4 IT(12) 0.00 0.29, 0.29
Yamagishi et al. (2005) 106 JP/AU PD N/A 2 OS 0.00 0.39, 0.39
Yamagishi & Mifune (2009) 131 JP PD SAME 2 OS 0.21 0.56, 0.12
Yamagishi et al. (2007) 105 JP PD N/A 2 OS 0.77 0.20, 1.34
Note. N number of participants in study. An asterisk indicates that a study reported a null finding and that the effect size is estimated as zero. CO country;
DV  dependent variable; SAME  same-sex pairs or groups; MIXED  mixed-sex pairs or groups; GS  group size in social dilemma; OS  one-shot
dilemma; IT(##)  iterated dilemma (number of iterations); LL  lower limit; UL  upper limit; SE  Sweden; CA  Canada; IN  India; US  United
States; JP  Japan; SG  Singapore; RU  Russia; NL  the Netherlands; BE  Belgium; KE  Kenya; UK  United Kingdom; TW  Taiwan; DE 
Germany; CH  Switzerland; IL  Israel; AU  Australia; PD  prisoner’s dilemma; PGD  give-some game or public goods dilemma; O  Other;
TS  take-some game or resource dilemma; N/A  not applicable.
Table 3
Results of the Univariate Categorical Moderator Analyses
Variable and class k (k with null estimates) d (d with null estimates) T (T with null estimates)
Sex of partner(s)
Same 58 (89) 0.16 (0.09) .27 (.19)
Mixed 90 (144) 0.22 (0.14) .25 (.19)
Sex of partner (dyads only)
Same 44 (66) 0.22 (0.13) .25 (.19)
Mixed 42 (62) 0.30 (0.20) .22 (.19)
Type of dilemma
Public goods dilemma 58 (81) 0.01 (0.01) .26 (.20)
Prisoner’s dilemma 74 (115) 0.08 (0.05) .29 (.21)
Take-some dilemma 12 (21) 0.30 (0.18) .19 (.15)
Country of participants
United States 108 (172) 0.02 (0.003) .32 (.23)
Canada 10 (12) 0.26 (0.21) .20 (.19)
Japan 6 (10) 0.10 (0.05) .24 (.11)
United Kingdom 7 (11) 0.18 (0.15) .25 (.30)
Netherlands 15 (25) 0.11 (0.05) .25 (.14)
 p  .05.
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der composition and number of iterations are no longer signifi-
cantly related to the sex–cooperation relationship after controlling
for the variance explained by these other methodological features,
we conducted a random-effects multiple regression analysis in
SPSS using the syntax provided by Lipsey and Wilson (2001). The
model predicting the effect size included the variables, mixed
(coded as 1) versus same-sex interactions (coded as 2), number of
iterations, group size, year of publication, and type of dilemma
(public goods and prisoner’s dilemmas were coded as 1, and
resource dilemmas were coded as 2). To conduct a relatively
conservative analysis, we included the null findings that were
coded as zero effect. The overall model explained a significant
amount of variation in the effect size distribution, R2  .10, Q(5,
173)  41.75, p  .001. Supporting the prior analyses, gender
composition was significantly positively related to the sex–
cooperation relationship (  .18, p  .003). The positive rela-
tionship between the number of iterations and the effect size also
remained significant (  .18, p  .004). As before, this analysis
suggests that men were more cooperative than women in same-sex
groups and over several iterations, whereas women were more
cooperative than men in mixed-sex groups. However, when we
controlled for the variance explained by these two variables, then
group size, year of publication, and type of dilemma were no
longer significantly related to the effect size. This is likely due to
some confounding between the study characteristics.5
Sex of Partner and Cooperation: Ruling Out an
Alternative Explanation
Lastly, we note that the greater cooperation between male–male
dyads versus female–female dyads as well as greater female than
male cooperation in mixed dyads might be due to people being
generally more cooperative with men than women. To tease apart
whether partner sex could be underlying such sex differences, we
examined whether both men and women are more generally in-
clined to cooperate with either male or female partners. Of the
studies that reported sex differences in cooperation, only 10 studies
reported the main effect of sex of partner on cooperation. The
effect sizes of these studies are reported in Table 5. The overall
effect indicates that individuals were more cooperative while in-
teracting with women compared to men (d  –0.38, 95% CI
[–0.002, –0.75]). Although there is heterogeneity in the effect size
distribution (T  .57, T2  .32), which can potentially be ex-
plained by between study differences (I2 91.23), we refrain from
exploring moderators of this relationship due to the low sample
size.
This effect, however, may be due to a publication bias. In fact,
several statistics raise our concerns about a possible publication
bias. First, Egger’s regression intercept is marginally significant,
t(8)  1.95, p  .08. Second, applying Duval and Tweedie’s
(2000) Trim and Fill approach, two studies were trimmed below
the mean and this resulted in a lager estimated effect size (d 
–0.59, 95% CI [–1.02, –0.16]). There were no studies trimmed
above the mean. Lastly, calculating Orwin’s fail-safe N suggests
only 33 studies with a value of d  –0.05 would reduce the effect
size to non-significance. According to Hedges and Olkin (1985), to
ensure confidence in the results, Orwin’s fail-safe N should be 5
times the number of studies (here, 5  10  50) plus 10 (50 
10  60). Because this small sample of effect sizes may contain a
publication bias, the current results are relatively inconclusive
regarding the main effect of partner sex on cooperation. Never-
theless, they reduce our concern that our earlier analyses can be
explained by people being more cooperative with men than
women.
Discussion
This meta-analytic review examined sex differences in cooper-
ation using the extant literature on social dilemmas—situations
5 We also examined the interactions between partner sex with either the
number of iterations, group size, or year of publication. We found statis-
tically significant two-way interactions between partner sex and both group
size and year of publication predicting the effect size. Follow-up analyses
suggested that among same-sex interactions, both group size and year of
publication were negatively related to the effect size (  –.19, p  .005;
  –.19, p  .002, respectively). However, for mixed-sex interactions,
both group size and year of publication were unrelated to the effect size
(  .06, p .33;   .02, p .71, respectively). Among all the same-sex
studies, however, the moderators are still correlated. Therefore, we con-
ducted a multiple regression model using only the studies coded as same-
sex to see whether both year of publication and group size remain signif-
icant predictors of the effect size after controlling for the number of
iterations. After controlling for the number of iterations, both year of
publication and group size were non-significant predictors of the same-sex
study effect sizes, whereas the number of iterations continued to predict the
effect size (  .28, p  .002).
Table 4
Correlations Between Study Characteristics
Study characteristic 1 2 3 4 5
1. Gender composition —
2. No. of iterations .42 —
3. Group size .13 .09 —
4. Year of publication .51 .55 .08 —
5. Type of dilemma .20 .09 .02 .10 —
Note. Gender composition: mixed-sex studies 1, same-sex studies 2;
type of dilemma: prisoner’s dilemma and public goods dilemmas  1,
resource dilemmas  2.
 p  .05.
Table 5
Studies Reporting the Relationship Between Partner Sex and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
Study n d LL, UL
Carment (1974) 66 0.71 1.23, 0.19
M. L. Clark (1983) 120 0.35 0.01, 0.71
Ferguson & Schmitt (1988) 40 2.65 3.25, 2.05
Grant & Sermat (1969) 48 0.76 1.35, 0.18
Orbell et al. (1994) 94 0.18 0.56, 0.20
Study 2 68 0.04 0.42, 0.34
Pilisuk et al. (1968) 176 0.13 0.44, 0.19
N. S. Smith et al. (1975) 96 0.07 0.07, 0.21
Takahashi et al. (2006) 99 0.58 0.99, 0.18
Wiley (1968) 96 0.41 0.01, 0.81
Note. LL  lower limit; UL  upper limit.
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involving a conflict between maximizing personal versus collec-
tive interests (“mixed motive” games). Previous reviews examined
sex differences in prosocial behaviors such as helping (Eagly,
2009; Eagly & Crowley, 1986) and heroism (S. W. Becker &
Eagly, 2004), whereas other reviews have considered sex differ-
ences in competitive behaviors such as aggression (Archer, 2004,
2009; Bettencourt & Miller, 1996; Eagly & Steffen, 1986) and
negotiations (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998).
Yet, these results do not necessarily generalize to mixed-motive
settings such as social dilemmas, which are psychologically unique
because there is a tension between personal and collective interests
in deciding whether people want to cooperate. Furthermore, the
social dilemma paradigm has a high internal validity and is appli-
cable to many real-world problems, which adds to the credibility of
the results.
Our meta-analytic review of 50 years of experimental research
on social dilemmas including 272 effect sizes and 31,462 partic-
ipants revealed a number of interesting results. First, we found no
overall difference between the sexes in cooperation in social
dilemmas (d  –0.05). This result confirms previous narrative
reviews of the literature (e.g., Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Ledyard,
1995; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; Walters et al., 1998; Weber et al.,
2004), and we can now conclude that this is a robust finding. This
result is aligned with Hyde’s (2005) perspective that men and
women are equal on most psychological phenomena. Importantly,
however, Hyde acknowledged that gender differences can vary
according to features of the situation. Examining context-specific
sex differences in cooperation, we find that men are more coop-
erative in same-sex interactions (d  0.16), whereas women are
more cooperative in mixed-sex interactions (d  –0.22). Also, as
the game continues for several rounds, men become increasingly
more cooperative than women. Finally, sex differences in cooper-
ation are largely unaffected by group size, year of publication, or
the type of dilemma. Below, we discuss these findings in the
context of both sociocultural and evolutionary perspectives on sex
differences in social behavior.
Are Women or Men More Cooperative?
The sociocultural perspective suggests that women are social-
ized more into communal roles and men into agentic roles. This
produces sex differences in communal and agentic oriented behav-
iors (Wood & Eagly, 2010), which can be explained by the
proximate mechanisms of gender stereotypes that reflect these
orientations (Eagly & Steffen, 1984) as well as men and women
regulating their behaviors according to standards consistent with
these orientations (Wit & Wood, 2010). As we argued earlier, a
relatively greater communal orientation and less agentic orienta-
tion of women would predict that women are more cooperative
(and therefore less selfish) than men in social dilemmas. It is
equally important to note, however, that these predicted sex dif-
ferences in cooperation emerge in particular when these gender
stereotypes or standards are salient (Deaux & Major, 1987).
Similarly, an evolutionary perspective does not make a strong
claim about a main effect of sex on cooperation. Humans are
thought to have evolved context-dependent decision rules for
determining whether or not they should cooperate. For instance,
whereas it is adaptive for men and women to defect in one-shot
interactions both men and women should be more cooperative in
repeated games with the same partners. Thus, it is unlikely that
sex-differentiated adaptations would have emerged in our evolu-
tionary history that incline either women or men to be generally
more cooperative—that is, indiscriminately across a wide range of
situations.
As it turns out, there were no meaningful overall sex differences
in cooperation in our meta-analytic review. Future research may
look at when gender-based communal and agentic stereotypes
and/or standards are activated in specific social dilemma situations
and whether such gender stereotypes are evolved or learnt through
socialization.
Cooperation in Same-Sex Interactions
The sociocultural perspective suggested that female same-sex
interactions would be more cooperative than male same-sex inter-
actions. This is because boys and girls learn at a very young age
distinct forms of social interactions with same-sex others, and
these forms of interactions share features characteristic of agentic
and communal orientations, respectively (Maccoby, 1990; Mac-
coby & Jacklin, 1987). Although this hypothesis finds support in a
single study (Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994), our meta-
analytic findings indicate just the opposite: Men are actually more
cooperative than women during same-sex interactions.
This finding is more in tune with an evolutionary perspective.
According to an evolutionary perspective, two selective pressures
in our ancestral environments may have selected for male coop-
eration to overcome social dilemmas: hunting large packaged prey
and warfare/inter-group conflict (e.g., Bowles, 2009; Foley & Lee,
1989; Geary et al., 2003; Manson & Wrangham, 1991; Wrangham,
1999). The argument is that throughout human evolutionary his-
tory, male coalitions have been an effective strategy for men to
acquire reproductively relevant resources (e.g., Gat, 2006; Gui-
laine & Zammit, 2004; Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc & Register, 2003;
Thayer, 2004; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). Both hunting and
warfare are social dilemmas in that they firmly pit individual and
group interests against each other. For instance, each individual is
better off enjoying the spoils of hunting or war without actually
having to do the work or take any risks. Yet, if everyone acts upon
their immediate self-interest, then no food will be provided, and
wars will be lost. To overcome such social dilemmas requires
strategies to cooperate with each other, and the evidence suggests
that this has produced a suite of male coalitional adaptations,
including male bonding and male-to-male cooperation. For exam-
ple, men display increased levels of cooperation during inter-group
competition (Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007; Yuki &
Yakota, 2009), show greater amounts of ingroup favoritism in
same-sex groups (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009), have greater levels
of cooperation in same-sex dyads (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965),
and tend to be more accommodating during interpersonal conflict
(Benenson et al., 2009; Eckel & Grossman, 1996). In contrast,
there were no specific pressures on ancestral women to provide
these highly salient public goods and the physical risks involved in
contributing to hunting and warfare selected against women’s
participation in such tasks. Consistent with this view, the anthro-
pological evidence suggests that both hunting large packaged
resources and warfare are all-male activities in modern day and
ethnographically recent foraging societies—which is the best
available model of the way our ancestors lived—as they still are
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today (Dunbar, 1996; Kruger & Nesse, 2004; Potts & Hayden,
2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996).
As a side issue, several researchers have proposed that the
evolution of male cooperation has likely been facilitated by a
history of male kin co-residency, whereby ingroups consist of
genetically related men, such as brothers and cousins, with unre-
lated women (Dunbar, 1996; Geary et al., 2003; Lovejoy, 2009;
Van Vugt & Ahuja, 2010; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996).6 Because
there was a high degree of genetic relatedness among the men in
these ancestral groups, there were clear genetic benefits associated
with male cooperation (Hamilton, 1964; Pasternak, Ember, &
Ember, 1997). Such an ancestral environment would have made it
easier for men to evolve a male coalitional psychology.
Conversely, because women usually migrated between groups,
they would have been interacting mostly with non-kin women.
These women tended not to be relatives, and many were co-wives.
Indeed, ancestral hunter–gatherer societies were mildly polgy-
nous, as they are today, which means that social dynamics among
women would have been rife with sexual competition (Dupanloup
et al., 2003; Flinn & Low, 1986; Hammer, Mendez, Cox, Woerner,
& Wall, 2008; Josephson, 2002; M. B. Mulder, 1992; Sellen, 1999;
Strassman, 1997). Thus, in an ancestral group environment that
was mildly polygynous with men controlling access to resources
and providing offspring care, women may have evolved disposi-
tions to be less cooperative with other women (Benenson, Marko-
vits, Thompson, & Wrangham, 2011; Geary, 2009). Hence, one
would expect less cooperation among women, and this is what our
meta-analytic findings show.
Cooperation in Mixed-Sex Interactions
The sociocultural perspective suggests that as a result of social
roles, women are actually more kind and cooperative and that
female stereotypes reflect these behavioral dispositions—a stereo-
type relevant to social dilemmas. In fact, women are expected to
cooperate more than men in a social dilemma (e.g., Orbell et al.,
1994), and this belief especially exists among women (Aguiar,
Branas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Jimenez, & Miller, 2009; Greig &
Bohnet, 2009; Lacy, 1978). Because women (and men) are eval-
uated negatively when they engage in counter-stereotypical behav-
iors (Costrich et al., 1975), they may be motivated to conform to
their stereotypes. Furthermore, such gender stereotypical beliefs
are likely to be stronger in interactions with the opposite sex
because such situations activate the gender roles (Deaux & Major,
1987). Accordingly, if men and women possess agentic and com-
munal self-concepts, then this should be especially salient in
mixed-sex interactions (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Skrypnek & Sny-
der, 1982). Thus, a salient stereotype in mixed-sex social dilemmas
may lead to communally oriented women to be more cooperative,
and agentic oriented men to become less cooperative. This is
indeed what we find: Women are more cooperative than men in
mixed-sex interactions.
An evolutionary perspective offers an alternative explanation
for these findings. Although the social dilemma context is not a
mating context per se, one could argue that in mixed-sex interac-
tions, mating motives are nevertheless sometimes salient (Li, Hal-
terman, Cason, Knight, & Maner, 2008). Sexual selection theory
asserts (Buss & Schmidt, 1993) that men and women have evolved
to pay attention to different qualities in potential mates. Whereas
men tend to prefer a mate who is prosocial and kind, women tend
to prefer a high-status mate who is socially dominant because it
conveys the man’s success in resource competitions with other
men (Buss, 1989; Gangestad, Simpson, Cousins, Garver-Apgar, &
Christensen, 2004; Kelly & Dunbar, 2001; Li, Bailey, Kenrick, &
Linsenmeier, 2002; Sadalla, Kenrick, & Vershure, 1987). Thus, if
such mate preferences are salient when men and women interact,
women would be motivated to cooperate more and men less.
Subsequent experimental research could pit the sociocultural
and evolutionary predictions against each other by further exam-
ining situational cues eliciting sex differences in cooperation in
mixed-sex interactions. An evolutionary hypothesis predicts that
when men and women are being primed with mating motives—for
example, imagining going on a date with an attractive opposite sex
partner (Griskevicius et al., 2007)—this should exacerbate sex
differences in cooperation. The sociocultural perspective predicts
no such effect. In contrast, gender role primes—for example,
imagining working in a traditional gender role job—would en-
hance sex differences in cooperation (and this effect might be
larger among people strongly endorsing gender stereotypes).
Cooperation During Repeated Interactions
The sociocultural perspective suggests that because women are
expected to be generally kinder and more concerned about others,
they are more likely to accommodate a partner’s defection. Men,
however, as a result of their agentic roles may be more dominant
and be inclined to retaliate in response to a partner’s defection.
This suggests that over the course of an interaction with the same
partners, women will become more cooperative, whereas men will
become less cooperative (sometimes ending up in a cycle of
mutual defection). The meta-analysis results show the opposite:
Over time, men became more cooperative than women during
repeated social dilemmas.
6 Three lines of evidence suggest men tended to reside throughout life
among close consanguineal kin, whereas women transferred residence
away from kin at sexual maturity or marriage. First, human’s closest living
ancestors, chimpanzees, bonobos, and gorillas, all practice male philopatry
with moderate female dispersal (e.g., Boesch & Boesch-Achermann, 2000;
Bradley, Doran-Sheehy, Lukas, Boesch, & Vigiliant, 2004; Chapais, 2008;
Goodall, 1986; Nishida et al., 2003; Watts, 1996), and phylogenetic anal-
yses suggest that primate co-residential patterns are conservative over time
(Chapais, 2008; Thierry, Iwaniuk, & Pellis, 2000). Second, behavioral
studies on modern forager populations suggest they disproportionately
practice sex-biased affiliation among male kin, with a tendency for brothers
to co-reside (Hill et al., 2011). Moreover, cross-cultural research, finds that
the majority of current human societies are normatively patrilocal (Mur-
dock & Wilson, 1980). Lastly, some human population genetic studies
show evidence of an evolutionary history of female-biased dispersal pat-
terns (Balaresque, Manni, Dugoujon, Crousau-Roy, & Heyer, 2006; Seiel-
stad, Minch, & Cavalli-Sforza, 1998; Wilson et al., 2001). Recently, the
traditional position in anthropology that foragers practiced male philopatry
(e.g., Ember, 1975; Foley, 1995) has been challenged in both the ethno-
graphic literature (e.g., Marlowe, 2004) and in human population genetics
(e.g., Wilder, Kingan, Mobasher, Pilkington, & Hammer, 2004). However,
an adaptation for relatively stronger male same-sex cooperation may still
exist regardless of sex-biased co-residency and dispersal patterns. For
example, male inter-group competition may have been an enduring social
challenge that could alone place enough selective pressure for the emer-
gence of an adaptation for male intragroup cooperation.
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This finding, however, supports an evolutionary line of reason-
ing. In male groups, cooperation is maintained primarily through
dominance hierarchies (Geary, 2010). Although such hierarchies
tend to involve some degree of interpersonal conflict, they evolved
specifically to facilitate social cohesion (Buss, 2005; de Waal,
2000; Hemelrijk & Gygax, 2004). Thus, although men can fight
with each other, they may be more tolerant of defections because
of the benefits of prolonged male cooperation (Benenson, 2009;
Geary et al., 2003). Indeed, developmental research finds that boys
and adult men are more tolerant of interpersonal conflicts than
girls and adult women (Benenson et al., 2009; Eckel & Grossman,
1996; Vigil, 2007).
There is other evidence too that women adhere to a strict
tit-for-tat strategy in social dilemmas and are less tolerant of
defection, especially when interacting with the same partner over
time. Ben-Ner, Putterman, Kong, and Magan (2004) found that for
women, more so than men, the amount given to another person in
a dictator game hinged on how much the other person gave them
on a previous trial. Behavioral economics findings suggest that
women are more inclined to reciprocate the other person’s trust or
distrust (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008; Chaudhuri & Gangad-
haran, 2003; Croson & Buchan, 1999; Schwieren & Sutter, 2008;
Snijders & Keren, 2001) and are more punitive of unfair behavior.
A strict tit-for-tat strategy can result in prolonged periods of
mutual defection (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman &
Marshello, 1975). Thus, if women are inclined to mirror others’
actions, they may, compared to men, show less cooperation over
time with the same partners.
Group Size and Cooperation
The sociocultural perspective suggests that sex differences in
social roles may result in sex differences in the importance of close
relationships and group memberships in defining women’s and
men’s self-concepts, respectively (Baumeister & Sommer, 1997;
Cross & Madson, 1997). An implication of this perspective is that
women may be more cooperative in social dilemmas involving
close interpersonal dyadic interactions, and men may be more
cooperative than women in larger group social dilemmas. From an
evolutionary perspective, it has also been suggested that men may
possess social cognitive adaptations that support relatively greater
amounts of male cooperation in larger groups (Markovits &
Benenson, 2010; Van Vugt, 2009). Although one study has found
that men are more cooperative than women in larger groups
(Gabriel & Gardner, 1999), this study asked participants about
their intentions to cooperate. Our review, which is based on actual
behavior, does not support this hypothesis: After controlling for
several study characteristics, group size did not affect sex differ-
ences in cooperation.
Year of Publication
According to the sociocultural perspective, if women assume
more agentic roles or gain greater status, then this should subse-
quently change gender roles (Diekman & Eagly, 2008; Eagly &
Wood, 2011; Wood & Eagly, 2010). In fact, there is evidence that
women have become more agentic over time but still remain more
communally oriented than men (Twenge, 1997, 2001). Although
our initial analysis of year of publication suggested that women
became relatively more cooperative than men in more recent years,
after controlling for several study characteristics that were corre-
lated with the year of publication, the effect of year of publication
disappeared. These findings suggest that societal changes and their
corresponding effects on social roles and gender stereotypes do not
seem to have impacted sex differences in cooperation—at least in
the laboratory studies examined in this meta-analysis. An evolu-
tionary perspective, on the other hand, forwards the position that
some sex differences in social behavior are the result of sex-
specific adaptations that should be persistent over time in the
population. However, adaptations tend to be sensitive to changes
in social environments including, for example, reduced gender
inequality or changes in sex ratios. Although research has sug-
gested that sex-specific cooperative propensities are modulated by
unique socio-ecologies (Macfarlan & Quinlan, 2008), there have
been no theoretical developments about how specific features of a
culture (e.g., marriage or residential rules) systematically affect
sex-typical adaptations for cooperation. Also, we do not know how
such sex-typical adaptations may interact with changes in recent
culture over the past 50 years. In this regard, an integrative
approach that seeks to understand how adaptations and culture
mutually constrain and influence each other may be useful (Ken-
rick, Li, & Butner, 2003).
Summary of Findings
Although we found that women and men were similarly coop-
erative in general, the evolutionary and sociocultural perspectives
put forward separate hypotheses about and explanations for
context-specific sex differences in cooperation. Consistent with a
sociocultural perspective, women were more cooperative in
mixed-sex social dilemmas. Stereotypes of men and women are
more likely to be activated in mixed-sex interactions. To match
these stereotypes, women may become more cooperative and men
less cooperative. Alternatively, an evolutionary perspective sug-
gests that men may desire to signal social dominance to potential
mates, leading to less cooperation by men than women. Also
consistent with an evolutionary approach, which assumes that men
have evolved specialized mechanisms for same-sex cooperation
and greater tolerance for another’s defection, men were more
cooperative in same-sex groups, including dyads, and men became
more cooperative over several iterations of the dilemma. These
findings were contrary to a sociocultural perspective that predicted
greater female same-sex cooperation and women being relatively
more cooperative in response to another’s defection. Additionally,
the meta-analysis showed no support for either a sociocultural or
evolutionary perspective that suggests men would be more coop-
erative in larger groups. Finally, although sex differences in social
behavior were hypothesized from a sociocultural perspective to
have changed over the last 50 years, our analysis did not indicate
any significant change in sex differences in cooperation during this
time.
Taken together, our meta-analytic review finds some support for
both the evolutionary and sociocultural accounts of sex differences
in cooperation. Indeed, we believe future research on sex differ-
ences in cooperation would be best served by the development of
an integrated evolutionary and sociocultural perspective.
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Theoretical Implications: Integrating Evolutionary and
Cultural Perspectives
Sex differences in cooperation are perhaps better understood as
a function of both evolutionary and cultural processes. Although a
full theoretical integration of these perspectives is beyond the
scope of this article (for previous attempts, see Archer, 1996, 2009;
Kenrick et al., 2003), we briefly address two features of this
integration and their importance for future research on sex differ-
ences.
First, evolved psychological sex differences may constrain the
influence of the current social environment. For example, sex-
typical adaptations may affect both the socialization process of
boys and girls (Low, 1989) and the emergence of sex differentiated
cooperative institutions (Kenrick & Luce, 2000; Kenrick, Trost, &
Sundie, 2004). In this regard, an evolved male coalitional psychol-
ogy explains why across all cultures there is an overrepresentation
of men in business, politics, and warfare (Van Vugt, 2009; Wood
& Eagly, 2002; Whyte, 1978) and why men are more cooperative
especially under conditions of intergroup threat (Bugental & Beau-
lieu, 2009; Van Vugt et al., 2007; Yuki & Yokota, 2009) and in
repeated interactions with the same partners (Benenson et al.,
2011; Geary et al., 2003). In the absence of such ancestrally
relevant cues, sex differences in cooperation are less likely to
appear. Future research may extend this analysis by examining
how cultural influences can exacerbate or diminish the influence of
sex-typical adaptations for cooperation.
Second, values and behavior are influenced by cultural factors.
Through cultural transmission processes, humans learn what is
socially appropriate (D’Andrade, 1989), including stereotypical
beliefs associated with sex roles. Two important cultural variables
that may affect sex differences in cooperation are the family
context (Belsky, Steinberg, & Draper, 1991; Flinn & Ward, 2005)
and institutional structures (e.g., marriage and residence rules;
Low, 1989). These cultural factors systematically affect socializa-
tion processes that may in turn reinforce or diminish the manifes-
tation of sex differences in cooperation. Low’s (1989) cross-
cultural research shows that parents in patrilocal societies (a
marriage rule specifying men and their brides reside among kins-
men after marriage, as such power is shared among male kin) teach
boys to cooperate with each other and to obey authority figures,
which facilitates the emergence of male cooperative groups headed
by older men. In cultures in which male–male coalitions have less
functional importance and male–female coalitions are more im-
portant (feminine cultures; Hofstede, 2001), socialization pro-
cesses are likely to be less sex differentiated.
In general, the cultural environment likely provides important
informational inputs for the evolution and the processing of adap-
tive decision rules, which operate at the individual level (Cos-
mides, Tooby, & Barkow, 1992; N. Henrich & Henrich, 2007;
Kenrick et al., 2003). In turn, individuals interacting with one
another, each with their evolved decision rules for adaptively
processing information, dynamically comprise culture. Thus, cul-
tural and evolutionary processes are likely intertwined, and an
integrative approach, which seeks to understand how adaptations
and culture mutually constrain and influence each other, may be
most useful in understanding complex social phenomena such as
sex differences in cooperation.
Social Dilemmas as a Paradigm to Examine Sex
Differences in Cooperation
Social dilemma studies provide an exceptional context to study
sex differences in cooperation, because these experiments are
highly controlled situations that directly pit self against collective
interests. Because these conflicts of interests are pervasive in our
day-to-day social lives (Van Lange & Joireman, 2008), our find-
ings generalize to a myriad of contexts involving dyads and
groups. Furthermore, the diversity of studies in our sample enabled
us to zoom in on key situational features affecting sex differences
in cooperation. For instance, each study either allowed same-sex or
mixed-sex interactions, had a predetermined number of group
members, and had a predetermined number of iterations. However,
the studies were limited in that they did not compare interactions
between ingroup versus outgroup members, friends versus strang-
ers, and kin versus non-kin. Future research on sex differences in
cooperation will benefit by constructing experimental social di-
lemma contexts that manipulate these and other features of the
situation that are hypothesized—based on an integrated evolution-
ary and cultural theory—to affect sex differences in cooperation
(Van Vugt et al., 2007).
Do social dilemmas enable us to test for sex differences in
competition and aggression? Theoretically, the social dilemma
is not a test of cooperation versus competition (aggression) but
of cooperation versus defection (i.e., not cooperating). There
are many reasons why people may defect in social dilemmas,
and only one of them is having a competitive motivation—
normally only about 5% of participants have a competitive
orientation (Au & Kwong, 2004; Komorita & Parks, 1994).
Moreover, prior research suggests that people defect in social
dilemmas—at least in the laboratory contexts we include in our
meta-analysis— because of a concern for self-interest, not com-
petition (Komorita & Parks, 1994). Hypotheses about sex dif-
ferences in competition (or aggression) should be tested in
competitive economic games, such as zero-sum or maximizing
difference games.
Our meta-analytic findings extend previous work on social
dilemmas in important ways. Walters et al. (1998) conducted a
quantitative review of sex differences in two-person social dilem-
mas and also failed to find an overall main effect of sex. Our
analysis goes further in several ways. First, whereas Walters et al.
only examined behavior in prisoner’s dilemma games, we exam-
ined behavior in all types of social dilemmas. In doing so, we
found that men’s and women’s behavior in dilemmas are affected
not only by the sex of the interaction partners but also the number
of iterations of the dilemma. Second, whereas Walters et al. only
considered dyadic interactions, we examined behavior in both
dyads and larger groups. Third, their sample included many null
findings that were estimated as zero effect sizes relative to actual
coded effect sizes. This is problematic because several of these
estimated null findings likely observed a mean difference between
men and women but lacked the statistical power to detect a small
effect size. In summary, our research overcomes some of the
limitations of previous research by examining sex differences in
cooperation in a much wider range of dilemmas with a much larger
sample of studies (k  51 vs. k  272).
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Practical Implications
Our meta-analytic findings are relevant to several disciplines in
psychology. For example, research in developmental psychology
may benefit from at least two aspects of the current research. First,
past research on children’s cooperation has often used paradigms
that align self-interest with cooperation (for review, see Knight &
Chao, 1989). However, the present findings suggest that by pitting
self-interest against cooperative motives, developmental research-
ers can more directly examine when children value the welfare of
others over personal welfare. Second, developmental researchers
may benefit from a careful consideration of how age interacts with
sex to predict cooperation in social dilemmas. Along these lines,
one study found that boys’ same-sex interactions become more
cooperative between 7 and 11 years of age, whereas 7–11-year-old
girls’ same-sex interactions become less cooperative (Sampson &
Kardush, 1965). Fehr et al. (2008) found that boys (3–8 years of
age) are more tolerant than girls of receiving a lower share of
outcomes than a fellow ingroup member, compared to when they
were interacting with an outgroup member. Such findings suggest
that a male bias toward cooperating with male ingroup members
develops relatively early. However, the results of the present
analysis suggest that these studies may benefit from manipulating
the gender composition of dyads/groups and examining cultural
influences that may exacerbate or inhibit sex differences such as
different socialization practices and different societal threats (war-
fare).
Cross-cultural psychology may benefit from a consideration of
how social roles correspond to structural aspects of the society,
including family structure and the workplace. Such roles may
moderate both male and female dispositions toward cooperation.
Andersen, Bulte, Gneezy, and List (2008) recently found that men
in a matrilineal society are more cooperative during mixed-sex
interactions than men in a patriarchal society. Future research
could expand on this work by controlling for additional cross-
cultural differences (e.g., cultural values) while measuring poten-
tial mediating mechanisms (e.g., social roles and male vs. female
stereotypes) of the effect of cultural differences on sex differences
in cooperation. More generally, there is a need to methodologically
isolate cultural variables to determine which aspects of culture are
affecting the sex–cooperation association and to study the psycho-
logical processes that mediate the culture–cooperation relation-
ship.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions
The conclusions of our meta-analysis are limited to the types of
social dilemmas included in our sample. Specifically, the studies
included in our analysis were social dilemmas in which the inter-
ests and outcomes of the players were symmetrical and there was
full information on others’ outcomes. Thus, the results of our
meta-analysis may not necessarily generalize to situations where
cooperation occurs in the context of asymmetrical dependency
(e.g., one partner has relatively more power) or information un-
certainty (e.g., not knowing a partner’s outcomes). Kelley et al.
(2003) noted that changes in the structure of a situation (e.g.,
greater asymmetrical dependence) will affect the expression of
particular traits and motives such as social dominance, which in
turn may influence the manifestation of sex differences in coop-
eration.
A common misperception about social dilemmas research is that
it lacks external validity. Yet, behavior in social dilemma experi-
ments predicts cooperation outside the laboratory very well. For
instance, the number of cooperative choices in dilemma games
predicts how much people donate to charitable causes (Van Lange,
Bekkers, Schuyt, & Van Vugt, 2007), and students quite accurately
predict how their roommate would behave in such paradigms
(Bem & Lord, 1979).
Another potential limitation of our work is that the effect sizes
in our studies are relatively small. However, small effect sizes are
common in meta-analytic reviews of sex differences and social
psychological research in general (Eagly & Wood, 1991; Hyde,
2005) and can still be considered important due to an accumulative
impact over time (Abelson, 1985; Martell, Lane, & Emrich, 1996).
Thus, we believe that the small effect sizes do not undermine the
importance of our findings. Finally, although our sample included
studies conducted in 18 countries, our search was limited to
English written articles, and most studies were conducted in the
United States. This is a concern because most studies in our sample
come from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Demo-
cratic (WEIRD) countries, and studies conducted in WEIRD coun-
tries can generate different results than those conducted elsewhere
(J. Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Our understanding of
the evolutionary and cultural basis of sex differences in coopera-
tion will benefit from including participants from non-Western
cultures.
Concluding Remarks
Since Maccoby and Jacklin’s (1974) review concluded that sex
differences in social behavior were small and negligible, a research
tradition developed to review sex differences in specific domains
such as aggression, helping, and leadership, applying meta-
analytic techniques. Our quantitative review extends this literature
by examining sex differences in social dilemmas. We started by
asking the question: Are women or men more cooperative? Our
answer: It depends. Women are not more cooperative than men, in
general. However, several factors moderate the sex–cooperation
relationship, including the sex of partner and the duration of the
interaction. Several findings support an evolutionary perspective
on sex differences in cooperation, but there is also some support
for a sociocultural perspective. Future research will benefit from
an integration of evolutionary and sociocultural approaches to
develop a more sophisticated theory of sex differences in social
behavior. Doing so will refine our questions and direct future
research efforts, resulting in a more comprehensive understanding
of the effect of sex on cooperation.
References
References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in the
meta-analysis.
Abelson, R. P. (1985). A variance explanation paradox: When a little is a
lot. Psychological Bulletin, 97, 129 –133. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.97.1.129
Aguiar, F., Branas-Garza, P., Cobo-Reyes, R., Jimenez, N., & Miller, L. M.
(2009). Are women expected to be more generous? Experimental Eco-
nomics, 12, 93–98. doi:10.1007/s10683-008-9199-z
*Ahmed, A. (2008). Can education affect pro-social behavior? Cops,
899SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
economists and humanists in social dilemmas. International Journal of
Social Economics, 35, 298–307. doi:10.1108/03068290810854565
*Alcock, J. E., & Mansell, D. (1977). Predisposition and behavior in a
collective dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 443–457. doi:
10.1177/002200277702100304
Alexander, R. D. (1987). The biology of moral systems. Carmel, IN:
Hawthorne.
*Andersen, S., Bulte, E., Gneezy, U., & List, J. A. (2008). Do women
supply more public goods than men? Preliminary experimental evidence
from matrilineal and patriarchal societies. American Economic Review,
98, 376–381. doi:10.1257/aer.98.2.376
Andersson, M. (1994). Sexual selection. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer-
sity Press.
*Ando, K. (1999). Social identification and a solution to social dilemmas.
Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 227–235. doi:10.1111/1467-
839X.00036
*Andreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2008). Beauty, gender, and stereotypes: Evi-
dence from laboratory experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology,
29, 73–93. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.07.008
Andreoni, J., & Vesterlund, L. (2001). Which is the fair sex? Gender
differences in altruism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 293–
312. doi:10.1162/003355301556419
*Anthony, D., & Horne, C. (2003). Gender and cooperation: Explaining
loan repayment in micro-credit groups. Social Psychology Quarterly, 66,
293–302. doi:10.2307/1519827
*Aranoff, D., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1968). Original states and behavior in the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Psychonomic Science, 12, 79–80.
Archer, J. (1996). Sex differences in social behavior: Are the social role
and evolutionary explanations compatible? American Psychologist, 51,
909–917. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.51.9.909
Archer, J. (2004). Sex differences in aggression in real-world settings: A
meta-analytic review. Review of General Psychology, 8, 291–322. doi:
10.1037/1089-2680.8.4.291
Archer, J. (2009). Does sexual selection explain human sex differences in
aggression? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32, 249–266. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X09990951
Au, W. T., & Kwong, Y. Y. (2004). Measurements and effects of social
value orientation in social dilemmas: A review. In R. Suleiman, D. V.
Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Contemporary research on
social dilemmas (pp. 71–98). New York, NY: Cambridge University
Press.
*Baker, F., & Rachlin, H. (2001). Probability of reciprocation in repeated
prisoner’s dilemma games. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 14,
51– 67. doi:10.1002/1099-0771(200101)14:151::AID-BDM365
3.0.CO;2-K
Balaresque, P., Manni, F., Dugoujon, J. M., Crousau-Roy, B., & Heyer, E.
(2006). Estimating sex-specific processes in human populations: Are
XY-homologous markers an effective tool? Heredity, 96, 214–221.
doi:10.1038/sj.hdy.6800779
*Balliet, D. (2009). [Sex differences in a public goods dilemma]. Unpub-
lished raw data, Singapore Management University, Singapore.
Balliet, D. (2010). Communication and cooperation in social dilemmas: A
meta-analytic review. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 39–57. doi:
10.1177/0022002709352443
Balliet, D., Mulder, L., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011). Reward, punish-
ment, and cooperation: A meta-analysis, Psychological Bulletin, 137,
594–615. doi:10.1037/a0023489
Balliet, D., Parks, C., & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and
cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Group Processes &
Intergroup Relations, 12, 533–547. doi:10.1177/1368430209105040
Balliet, D., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2011). Trust, state expectations, and
cooperation: A meta-analysis. Unpublished manuscript, VU University,
Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Barclay, P. (2010). Altruism as a courtship display: Some effects of
third-party generosity on audience perceptions. British Journal of Psy-
chology, 101, 123–135. doi:10.1348/000712609X435733
*Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Todd, R. M., Brummett, B. H., Shaw, L. L.,
& Aldeguer, C. M. R. (1995). Empathy and the collective good: Caring
for one of the others in a social dilemma. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 68, 619–631. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.68.4.619
Baumeister, R. F., & Sommer, K. L. (1997). What do women want?
Gender differences and two spheres of belongingness: Comment on
Cross and Madson (1997). Psychological Bulletin, 122, 38–44. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.122.1.38
Becker, S. W., & Eagly, A. H. (2004). The heroism of women and men.
American Psychologist, 59, 163–178. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.59.3.163
*Becker, W. M., & Miles, C. (1978). Interpersonal competition and coop-
eration as a function of sex of subject and sex of counterpart. The
Journal of Social Psychology, 104, 303–304. doi:10.1080/
00224545.1978.9924076
*Bedell, J., & Sistrunk, F. (1973). Power, opportunity costs, and sex in a
mixed-motive game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 25,
219–226. doi:10.1037/h0033947
*Belianin, A., & Novarese, M. (2005). Trust, communication, and equi-
librium behaviour in public goods game: A cross-country experimental
study. Unpublished manuscript, International College of Economic and
Finance, Moscow, Russia.
Belle, D. (1989). Gender differences in children’s social networks and
supports. In D. Belle (Ed.), Children’s social networks and social
supports (pp. 173–188). New York, NY: Wiley.
*Belot, M., Bhaskar, V., & van de Ven, J. (2006). A public dilemma:
Cooperation with large stakes and a large audience. Unpublished man-
uscript, University of Essex, Colchester, United Kingdom.
*Belot, M., Bhaskar, V., & van de Ven, J. (2010). Promises and cooper-
ation: Evidence from a TV game show. Journal of Economic Behavior
& Organization, 73, 396–405. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2010.01.001
Belsky, J., Steinberg, L., & Draper, P. (1991). Childhood experience,
interpersonal development, and reproductive strategy: An evolutionary
theory of socialization. Child Development, 62, 647–670. doi:10.2307/
1131166
Bem, D. J., & Lord, C. G. (1979). Template matching: A proposal for
probing the ecological validity of experimental settings in social psy-
chology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 833–846.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.6.833
Benenson, J. F. (2009). Dominating versus eliminating the competition:
Sex differences in human intrasexual aggression. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 32, 268–269. doi:10.1017/S0140525X0999046X
Benenson, J. F., Apostoleris, N. H., & Parnass, J. (1997). Age and sex
differences in dyadic and group interactions. Developmental Psychol-
ogy, 33, 538–543. doi:10.1037/0012-1649.33.3.538
Benenson, J. F., & Christakos, A. (2003). The greater fragility of females’
versus males’ closest same-sex friendships. Child Development, 74,
1123–1129. doi:10.1111/1467-8624.00596
Benenson, J. F., Markovits, H., Fitzgerald, C., Geoffroy, D., Flemming, J.,
Kahlenberg, S. M., & Wrangham, R. W. (2009). Male’s greater toler-
ance of same-sex peers. Psychological Science, 20, 184–190. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02269.x
Benenson, J. F., Markovits, H., Thompson, M. E., & Wrangham, R. W.
(2011). Under threat of social exclusion, females exclude more than
males. Psychological Science, 22, 538 –544. doi:10.1177/
0956797611402511
Ben-Ner, A., Putterman, L., Kong, F., & Magan, D. (2004). Reciprocity in
a two part dictator game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 53, 333–352. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2002.12.001
Bettencourt, B. A., & Miller, N. (1996). Gender differences in aggression
as a function of provocation: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
119, 422–447. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.119.3.422
*Bixenstine, V. E., Chambers, N., & Wilson, K. V. (1964). Effect of
900 BALLIET, LI, MACFARLAN, AND VAN VUGT
asymmetry in payoff on behavior in a two-person non-zero-sum game.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 8, 151–159. doi:10.1177/
002200276400800206
*Bixenstine, V. E., & Garebelein, J. W. (1971). Strategies of “real”
opponents in eliciting cooperative choice in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 15, 157–166. doi:10.1177/
002200277101500204
*Bixenstine, V. E., & O’Reilly, E. F. (1966). Money versus electric shock
as payoff in a prisoner’s dilemma game. The Psychological Record, 16,
251–264.
*Bixenstine, V. E., Potash, H. M., & Wilson, K. V. (1963). Effects of level
of cooperative choice by the other player on choices in a prisoner’s
dilemma game: Part I. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 66,
308–313. doi:10.1037/h0040167
*Bixenstine, V. E., & Wilson, K. V. (1963). Effects of level of cooperative
choice by the other player on choices in a prisoner’s dilemma game: Part
II. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 139–147.
doi:10.1037/h0044242
*Black, T. E., & Higbee, K. L. (1973). Effects of power, threat, and sex on
exploitation. The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 27,
382–388. doi:10.1037/h0034937
Boesch, C., & Boesch-Achermann, H. (2000). The chimpanzees of the Tai
Forest: Behavioral ecology and evolution. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Bolton, G. E., & Katok, E. (1995). An experimental test for gender
differences in beneficent behavior. Economic Letters, 48, 287–292.
doi:10.1016/0165-1765(94)00621-8
*Bonacich, P. (1972). Norms and cohesion as adaptive responses to po-
tential conflict: An experimental study. Sociometry, 35, 357–375. doi:
10.2307/2786500
*Boone, C., Brabander, B. D., & bvan Witteloostuijn, A. (1999). The
impact of personality on behavior in five prisoner’s dilemmas games.
Journal of Economic Psychology, 20, 343–377. doi:10.1016/S0167-
4870(99)00012-4
*Boone, C., Declerck, C., & Kiyonari, T. (2010). Inducing cooperative
behavior among proselfs versus prosocials: The moderating role of
incentives versus trust. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 799–824.
doi:10.1177/0022002710372329
Bowles, S. (2006, December 8). Group competition, reproductive leveling,
and the evolution of human altruism. Science, 314, 1569–1572. doi:
10.1126/science.1134829
Bowles, S. (2009, June 5). Did warfare amongst ancestral hunter-gatherers
affect the evolution of human social behaviors? Science, 324, 1293–
1298. doi:10.1126/science.1168112
Bradley, B. J., Doran-Sheehy, D. M., Lukas, D., Boesch, C., & Vigiliant,
L. (2004). Dispersed male networks in Western gorillas. Current Biol-
ogy, 14, 510–513. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2004.02.062
*Brickman, P., Becker, L. J., & Castle, S. (1979). Making trust easier and
harder through two forms of sequential interaction. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 37, 515–521. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.37.4.515
*Brown, A. (2006). Decision-making in social dilemmas: Positive and
negative framing, payoff structure, and affect (Unpublished doctoral
dissertation). Miami University, Oxford, OH.
*Brown, A., & Stasser, G. (2004). [Gender and take-some dilemmas].
Unpublished raw data, Miami University, Oxford, OH.
*Brown, K. M., & Taylor, L. O. (2000). Do as you say, say as you do:
Evidence on gender differences in actual and stated contributions to
public goods. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43, 127–
139. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(00)00113-X
*Brown-Kruse, J., & Hummels, D. (1993). Gender effects in laboratory
public goods contribution: Do individuals put their money where their
mouth is? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 22, 255–267.
doi:10.1016/0167-2681(93)90001-6
Buchan, N. R., Croson, R. T. A., & Solnick, S. (2008). Trust and gender:
An examination of behavior and beliefs in the investment game. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 68, 466–476. doi:10.1016/
j.jebo.2007.10.006
*Buchan, N. R., Grimalde, G., Wilson, R., Brewer, M., Fates, E., & Foddy,
M. (2009). Globalization and human cooperation. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 106,
4138–4142. doi:10.1073/pnas.0809522106
Bugental, D. B., & Beaulieu, D. A. (2009). Sex differences in response to
coalitional threat. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30, 238–243. doi:
10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.02.002
Buss, D. M. (1989). Sex differences in human mate preferences: Evolu-
tionary hypotheses tested in 37 cultures. Behavioral and Brain Sciences,
12, 1–49. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00023992
Buss, D. M. (1995). Psychological sex differences: Origins through selec-
tion. American Psychologist, 50, 164 –168. doi:10.1037/0003-
066X.50.3.164
Buss, D. M. (2005). The handbook of evolutionary psychology. Hoboken,
NJ: Wiley.
Buss, D. M., & Schmidt, D. P. (1993). Sexual strategies theory: An
evolutionary perspective on human mating. Psychological Review, 100,
204–232. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.100.2.204
*Cadsby, C. B., Hamaguchi, Y., Kawagoe, T., Maynes, E., & Song, F.
(2007). Cross-national gender differences in behavior in a threshold
public goods game: Japan versus Canada. Journal of Economic Psychol-
ogy, 28, 242–260. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2006.06.009
*Cadsby, C. B., & Maynes, E. (1998). Gender and free riding in a threshold
public goods game: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Be-
havior & Organization, 34, 603– 620. doi:10.1016/S0167-
2681(97)00010-3
*Caldwell, M. D. (1976). Communication and sex effects in a five-person
prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 33,
273–280. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.33.3.273
Campbell, A., Muncer, M., & Gorman, B. (1993). Sex and social representations
of aggression: A communal-agentic analysis. Aggressive Behavior, 19, 125–
135. doi:10.1002/1098-2337(1993)19:2125::AID-AB2480190205
3.0.CO;2-1
*Campbell, W. K., Bush, C. P., & Brunell, A. B. (2005). Understanding the
social costs of narcissism: The case of the tragedy of the commons.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1358 –1368. doi:
10.1177/0146167205274855
*Carment, D. W. (1974). Effects of sex role in a maximizing difference
game: A replication in Canada. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 18,
461–472. doi:10.1177/002200277401800305
Chapais, B. (2008). Primeval kinship: How pair-bonding gave birth to
human society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
*Charness, G., & Rustishini, A. (2010). Gender differences in cooperation
with group membership. Games and Economic Behavior, 72, 77–85.
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2010.07.006
Chatman, J. A., & O’Reilly, C. A. (2004). Asymmetric reactions to work
group sex diversity among men and women. Academy of Management
Journal, 47, 193–208. doi:10.2307/20159572
Chaudhuri, A., & Gangadharan, L. (2003). Gender differences in trust and
reciprocity. Unpublished manuscript, University of Auckland, New Zea-
land.
*Clark, K., & Sefton, M. (2001). The sequential prisoner’s dilemma:
Evidence on reciprocation. The Economic Journal, 111, 51–68. doi:
10.1111/1468-0297.00588
*Clark, M. L. (1983). Effect of confederate’s sex and status on competitive
behavior of male and female college students. The Journal of Psychol-
ogy, 113, 191–198. doi:10.1080/00223980.1983.9923575
*Cohen, T. R., Wildschut, T., & Insko, C. A. (2010). How communication
increases interpersonal cooperation in mixed-motive dilemmas. Journal
of Experimental Psychology, 46, 39–50. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.09.009
901SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
*Conrath, D. W. (1972). Sex role and “cooperation” in the game of
Chicken. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, 433–443. doi:10.1177/
002200277201600311
Conway, M., Pizzamiglio, M. T., & Mount, L. (1996). Status, communal-
ity, and agency: Implications for stereotypes of gender and other groups.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71, 25–38. doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.71.1.25
Cooper, H. M. (1998). Synthesizing research: A guide for literature re-
views (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
*Corfman, K. P., & Lehmann, D. R. (1994). The prisoner’s dilemma and
the role of information in setting advertising budgets. Journal of Adver-
tising, 23, 35–48.
Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., & Barkow, J. H. (1992). Introduction: Evolution-
ary psychology and conceptual integration. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cos-
mides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology
and the generation of culture (pp. 3–18). New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Costrich, N., Feinstein, J., Kidder, L., Marecek, J., & Pascale, L. (1975).
When stereotypes hurt: Three studies of penalties for sex-role reversals.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11, 520–530. doi:10.1016/
0022-1031(75)90003-7
Croson, R., & Buchan, N. (1999). Gender and culture: International ex-
perimental evidence from trust games. The American Economic Review,
89, 386–391. doi:10.1257/aer.89.2.386
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences.
Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 448–474. doi:10.1257/jel.47.2.448
*Croson, R., Marks, M., & Snyder, J. (2008). Group work for women:
Gender and group identity in social dilemmas. Negotiation Journal, 24,
411–427. doi:10.1111/j.1571-9979.2008.00195.x
Cross, S. E., & Madson, L. (1997). Models of the self: Self-construals and
gender. Psychological Bulletin, 122, 5–37. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.122.1.5
*Crowne, D. P. (1966). Family orientation, level of aspiration, and inter-
personal bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3,
641–645. doi:10.1037/h0023282
D’Andrade, R. G. (1989). Cultural cognition. In M. I. Posner (Ed.),
Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 795–830). Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Darwin, C. (1871). The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex.
New York, NY: Appleton.
Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31,
169–193. doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.001125
*Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J., & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, commu-
nication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons
dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35,
1–11. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.35.1.1
Deaux, K., & LaFrance, M. (1998). Gender. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske,
& G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., pp.
788–827). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Deaux, K., & Lewis, L. L. (1984). Structure of gender stereotypes: Inter-
relationships among components and gender label. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 46, 991–1004. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.46.5.991
Deaux, K., & Major, B. (1987). Putting gender into context: An interactive
model of gender-related behavior. Psychological Review, 94, 369–389.
doi:10.1037/0033-295X.94.3.369
*Declerck, C. H., Boone, C., & Kiyonari, T. (2010). Oxytocin and coop-
eration under conditions of uncertainty: The modulating role of incen-
tives in social information. Hormones and Behavior, 57, 368–374.
doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2010.01.006
*De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2009). Paying for sanction in social
dilemmas: The effects of endowment asymmetry and accountability.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 109, 45–55.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2009.01.004
De Dreu, C. K. W. (2010). Social conflict: The emergence and conse-
quences of struggle and negotiation. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G.
Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 983–1023).
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
de Waal, F. B. M. (2000, July 28). Primates—A natural heritage of conflict
resolution. Science, 289, 586–590. doi:10.1126/science.289.5479.586
Diekman, A. B., & Eagly, A. H. (2008). Of men, women, and motivation:
A role congruity account. In J. Y. Shaw & W. L. Gardner (Eds.),
Handbook of motivation science (pp. 434–447). London, England: Guil-
ford Press.
*Dolbear, F. T., Lave, L. B., Bowman, G., Lieberman, A., Prescott, E.,
Rueter, F., & Sherman, R. (1969). Collusion in the prisoner’s dilemma:
Number of strategies. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 13, 252–261.
doi:10.1177/002200276901300206
*Drouvelis, M., Metcalfe, R., & Powdthavee, N. (2010). Priming cooper-
ation in social dilemma games. Unpublished manuscript, University of
York, England.
Dufwenberg, M., & Muren, A. (2006). Generosity, anonymity, and gender.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61, 42–49. doi:10.1016/
j.jebo.2004.11.007
Dunbar, R. I. M. (1996). Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language.
New York, NY: Harvard University Press.
Dupanloup, I., Pereira, L., Bertorelle, G., Calafell, F., Prata, M. J., Amo-
rim, A., & Barbujani, G. (2003). A recent shift from polygyny to
monogamy in humans is suggested by the analysis of worldwide
Y-chromosome diversity. Journal of Molecular Evolution, 57, 85–97.
doi:10.1007/s00239-003-2458-x
Duval, S., & Tweedie, R. (2000). Trim and fill: A simple funnel-plot-based
method of testing and adjusting for publication bias in meta-analysis.
Biometrics, 56, 455–463. doi:10.1111/j.0006-341X.2000.00455.x
Eagly, A. H. (2009). The his and hers of prosocial behavior: An exami-
nation of the social psychology of gender. American Psychologist, 64,
644–658. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.64.8.644
Eagly, A. H., & Crowley, M. (1986). Gender and helping behavior: A
meta-analytic review of the social psychological literature. Psychologi-
cal Bulletin, 100, 283–308. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.100.3.283
Eagly, A. H., & Johnson, B. T. (1990). Gender and leadership style: A
meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 233–256. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.108.2.233
Eagly, A. H., & Steffen, V. J. (1984). Gender stereotypes stem from the
distribution of women and men into social roles. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 46, 735–754. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.4.735
Eagly, A. H., & Steffen, V. J. (1986). Gender and aggressive behavior: A
meta-analytic review of the social psychological literature. Psychologi-
cal Bulletin, 100, 309–330. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.100.3.309
Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. (1991). Explaining sex differences in social
behavior: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 17, 306–315. doi:10.1177/0146167291173011
Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. (1999). The origins of sex differences in human
behavior: Evolved dispositions versus social roles. American Psycholo-
gist, 54, 408–423. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.6.408
Eagly, A. H., & Wood, W. (2011). Social role theory. In P. A. M. Van
Lange, A. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Handbook of theories in
social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 458–476). London, England: Sage.
Eals, M., & Silverman, I. (1994). The hunter-gatherer theory of spatial sex
differences: Proximate factors mediating the female advantage in recall
of object arrays. Ethology and Sociobiology, 15, 95–105. doi:10.1016/
0162-3095(94)90020-5
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (1996). The relative price of fairness:
Gender differences in a punishment game. Journal of Economic Behav-
ior & Organization, 30, 143–158. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(96)00854-2
Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. J. (2001). Chivalry and solidarity in ultima-
tum games. Economic Inquiry, 39, 171–188. doi:10.1111/j.1465-
7295.2001.tb00059.x
902 BALLIET, LI, MACFARLAN, AND VAN VUGT
Eckes, T., & Trautner, H. M. (2000). Developmental social psychology of
gender: An integrative framework. In T. Eckes & H. M. Trautner (Eds.),
The developmental social psychology of gender (pp. 3–32). Mahwah,
NJ: Erlbaum.
*Eek, D., & Biel, A. (2003). The interplay between greed, efficiency, and
fairness in public-goods dilemmas. Social Justice Research, 16, 195–
215. doi:10.1023/A:1025984611796
Ember, C. R. (1975). Residential variation among hunter-gatherers. Cross-
Cultural Research, 10, 199–227. doi:10.1177/106939717501000302
*Enzle, M. E., Harvey, M. D., & Wright, E. F. (1992). Implicit role
obligations versus social responsibility in constituency representation.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 238 –245. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.62.2.238
*Evans, G. W., & Crumbaugh, C. M. (1966). Payment schedule, sequence
of choice, and cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Psycho-
nomic Science, 5, 87–88.
*Farrelly, D., Lazarus, J., & Roberts, G. (2007). Altruists attract. Evolu-
tionary Psychology, 5, 313–329.
Fehr, E., Bernhard, H., & Rockenbach, B. (2008, August 28). Egalitarian-
ism in young children. Nature, 454, 1079 –1083. doi:10.1038/
nature07155
Feingold, A. (1994). Gender differences in personality: A meta-analysis.
Psychological Bulletin, 116, 429 – 456. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.116.3.429
*Ferguson, E. D., & Schmitt, S. (1988). Gender-linked stereotypes and
motivation affect performance in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Percep-
tual and Motor Skills, 66, 703–714.
*Ferrin, D. L., Bligh, M. C., & Kohlse, J. C. (2008). It takes two to tango:
An interdependence analysis of the spiraling of perceived trustworthi-
ness and cooperation in interpersonal and intergroup relationships. Or-
ganizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 107, 161–178.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.02.012
*Fisher, R., & Smith, W. P. (1969). Conflict of interest and attraction in the
development of cooperation. Psychonomic Science, 14, 154–155.
*Fleishman, J. A. (1988). The effects of decision framing and others’
behavior on cooperation in a social dilemma. Journal of Conflict Res-
olution, 32, 162–180. doi:10.1177/0022002788032001008
Flinn, M. V., & Low, B. S. (1986). Resource distribution, social compe-
tition, and mating patterns in human societies. In D. Rubinstien & R.
Wrangham (Eds.), Ecological aspects of social evolution (pp. 217–243).
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Flinn, M. V., & Ward, C. V. (2005). Ontogeny and evolution of the social
child. In B. J. Ellis & D. F. Bjorkland (Eds.), Origins of the social mind:
Evolutionary psychology and child development (pp. 19–44). New
York, NY: Guilford Press.
Foley, R. (1995). The adaptive legacy of human evolution: A search for the
environment of evolutionary adaptedness. Evolutionary Anthropology,
4, 194–203. doi:10.1002/evan.1360040603
Foley, R. A., & Lee, P. C. (1989, February 17). Finite social space,
evolutionary pathways, and reconstructing hominid behavior. Science,
243, 901–906. doi:10.1126/science.2493158
*Fox, J., & Guyer, M. (1978). “Public” choice and cooperation in n-person
prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22, 469–481. doi:
10.1177/002200277802200307
*Frank, R. H., Gilovich, T., & Regan, D. T. (1993). Does studying
economics inhibit cooperation? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7,
159–171.
*Fundenberg, D., Rand, D. G., & Dreber, A. (2010). Slow to anger and fast
to forgive: Cooperation in an uncertain world. Unpublished manuscript,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
*Gabriel, S., & Gardner, W. L. (1999). Are there “his” and “hers” types of
interdependence? The implications of gender differences in collective
versus relational interdependence for affect, behavior, and cognition.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 642– 655. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.77.3.642
*Gallo, P. S., Funk, S. G., & Levine, J. R. (1969). Reward size, method of
presentation, and number of alternatives in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 239 –244. doi:
10.1037/h0028283
*Gallo, P., & Sheposh, J. (1971). Effects of incentive magnitude on
cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game: A reply to Gumpert,
Deutsch, and Epstein. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 19,
42–46. doi:10.1037/h0031092
Gangestad, S. W., Simpson, J. A., Cousins, A. J., Garver-Apgar, C. E., &
Christensen, P. N. (2004). Women’s preferences for male behavioral
displays change across the menstrual cycle. Psychological Science, 15,
203–207. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.01503010.x
*Garza, R. T., & Borchert, J. E. (1990). Maintaining social identity in a
mixed-gender setting: Minority/majority status and cooperative/
competitive feedback. Sex Roles, 22, 679 – 691. doi:10.1007/
BF00292054
Gat, A. (2006). War in human civilization. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press.
Geary, D. C. (2009). Sex differences in reciprocal altruism: Reply to
Mower. Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 39, 121–124.
doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.2008.00392.x
Geary, D. C. (2010). Male, female: The evolution of human sex differences.
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. doi:10.1037/
12072-000
Geary, D. C., Byrd-Craven, J., Haord, M. K., Vigil, J., & Numtee, C.
(2003). Evolution and development of boys’ social behavior. Develop-
mental Review, 23, 444–470. doi:10.1016/j.dr.2003.08.001
*Gillis, J. S., & Woods, G. T. (1971). The 16pf as an indicator of
performance in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
15, 393–402. doi:10.1177/002200277101500310
*Goehring, D. J., & Kahan, J. P. (1976). The uniform n-person prisoner’s
dilemma game: Construction and test of an index of cooperation.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20, 111–128. doi:10.1177/
002200277602000104
Goodall, J. (1986). The chimpanzees of Gombe: Patterns of behavior.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
*Granberg, D., & Stevens, J. S. (1975). Effect of communication on
cooperation in expanded prisoner’s dilemma and chicken games. Simu-
lation & Gaming, 6, 166–187. doi:10.1177/104687817500600203
*Grant, M. J., & Sermat, V. (1969). Status and sex of other as determinants
of behavior in a mixed-motive game. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 12, 151–157. doi:10.1037/h0027573
*Greig, F., & Bohnet, I. (2009). Exploring gendered behavior in the field
with experiments: Why public goods are provided by women in a
Nairobi slum. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70, 1–9.
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.12.006
Griskevicius, V., Tybur, J. M., Sundie, J. M., Cialdini, R. B., Miller, G. E.,
& Kenrick, D. T. (2007). Blatant benevolence and conspicuous con-
sumption: When romance motives elicit strategic costly signals. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 93, 85–102. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.93.1.85
Guilaine, J., & Zammit, J. (2004). The origins of war: Violence in prehis-
tory. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
*Hamburger, H., Guyer, M., & Fox, J. (1975). Group size and cooperation.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 19, 503–531. doi:10.1177/
002200277501900307
Hamilton, W. D. (1964). The genetical evolution of social behavior.
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7, 1–16. doi:10.1016/0022-
5193(64)90038-4
Hammer, M. F., Mendez, F. L., Cox, M. P., Woerner, A. E., & Wall, J. D.
(2008). Sex-biased evolutionary forces shape genomic patterns of human
diversity. PLoS Genetics, 4, 1–8. doi:10.1371/journal.pgen.1000202
903SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
*Hardy, C. L., & van Vugt, M. (2006). Nice guys finish first: The
competitive altruism hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 32, 1402–1413. doi:10.1177/0146167206291006
*Hartman, E. A. (1974). Degree of cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma as
a function of sex roles, responsiveness and the exploitativeness of the
simulated other. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1, 287–
289. doi:10.1177/014616727400100197
*Hartman, E. A. (1980). Motivational bases of sex differences in choice
behavior. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 455–475. doi:10.1177/
002200278002400304
Hawkes, K., & Bliege Bird, R. (2002). Showing off, handicap signaling,
and the evolution of men’s work. Evolutionary Anthropology, 11, 58–
67. doi:10.1002/evan.20005
Hedges, L. V., & Olkin, I. (1985). Statistical methods for meta-analysis.
Orlando, FL: Academic Press.
Hemelrijk, C. K., & Gygax, L. (2004). Dominance style, differences
between the sexes and species. Interaction Studies, 5, 131–146. doi:
10.1075/is.5.1.07hem
*Hemesath, M., & Pomponio, X. (1998). Cooperation and culture: Stu-
dents from China and the United States in a prisoner’s dilemma. Cross-
Cultural Research, 32, 171–184. doi:10.1177/106939719803200203
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). The weirdest people in
the world? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33, 61–83. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X0999152X
Henrich, N., & Henrich, J. (2007). Why humans cooperate: A cultural and
evolutionary explanation. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Hill, K. R., Walker, R., Bozievic, M., Eder, J., Headland, T., Hewlett, B.,
. . . Wood, B. (2011, March 11). Unique patterns of kin coresidence
characterize hunter-gatherer societies. Science, 331, 1286–1289. doi:
10.1126/science.1199071
Hofstede, G. (2001). Cultures consequences: Comparing values, behav-
iors, institutions, and organizations across nations (2nd ed.). Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hogg, M. A., & Turner, J. C. (1987). Intergroup behavior, self-
stereotyping, and the salience of social categories. British Journal of
Social Psychology, 26, 325–340. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8309
.1987.tb00795.x
*Holm, H. J. (2000). Gender-biased focal points. Games and Economic
Behavior, 32, 292–314. doi:10.1006/game.1998.0685
*Hopthrow, T., Abrams, D., Frings, D., & Hulbert, L. G. (2007). Group-
drink: The effects of alcohol on intergroup competitiveness. Psychology
of Addictive Behaviors, 21, 272–276. doi:10.1037/0893-164X.21.2.272
*Horai, J., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1969). Effects of credibility and magnitude
of punishment on compliance to threats. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 12, 164–169. doi:10.1037/h0027486
*Horai, J., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1975). Compliance and the use of threats and
promises after a power reversal. Behavioral Science, 20, 117–124.
doi:10.1002/bs.3830200204
*Hottes, J. H., & Kahn, A. (1974). Sex differences in a mixed-motive
conflict situation. Journal of Personality, 42, 260–275. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-6494.1974.tb00673.x
*Hu, Y., & Liu, D. (2003). Altruism versus egoism in human behavior of
mixed-motives. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 62,
677–705. doi:10.1111/1536-7150.00240
*Huntoon, A. (2006). Norms, personality traits, values, and gender: The
use of injunctive and descriptive norms in public goods dilemmas.
Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B. Sciences and Engineer-
ing, 67(2), 1206.
Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarity hypothesis. American Psychol-
ogist, 60, 581–592. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.60.6.581
*Insko, C. A., Kirchner, J. L., Pinter, B., Efaw, J., & Wildschut, T. (2005).
Interindividual–intergroup discontinuity as a function of trust and cate-
gorization: The paradox of expected cooperation. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 88, 365–385. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.88.2.365
*Insko, C. A., Pinkley, R. L., Hoyle, R. H., & Dalton, B. (1987). Individual
versus group discontinuity: The role of intergroup contact. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 23, 250 –267. doi:10.1016/0022-
1031(87)90035-7
*Insko, C. A., Schopler, J., Drigotas, S. M., & Graetz, K. A. (1993). The
role of communication in interindividual–intergroup discontinuity. Jour-
nal of Conflict Resolution, 37, 108 –138. doi:10.1177/
0022002793037001005
*Iredale, W., Van Vugt, M., & Dunbar, R. (2008). Showing off in humans:
Male generosity as a mating signal. Evolutionary Psychology, 6, 386–
392. doi:10.1556/JEP.2007.1013
*Jackson, J. W. (2001). Effects of endowment amount and attributions on
responses to a subgroup social dilemma. Group Dynamics: Theory,
Research, and Practice, 5, 67–80. doi:10.1037/1089-2699.5.2.67
*Jackson, J. W. (2008). Reactions to social dilemmas as a function of
group identity, rational calculations, and social context. Small Group
Research, 39, 673–705. doi:10.1177/1046496408322761
*James, T., Soroka, L., & Benjafield, J. G. (2001). Are economists rational,
or just different? Social Behavior and Personality, 29, 359–364. doi:
10.2224/sbp.2001.29.4.359
*Jaster, D., & Arrow, H. (2010). Trust in friends or loyalty to the group:
Sex differences in cooperation rates during public goods dilemmas.
Working paper, University of Oregon, Eugene.
Josephson, S. C. (2002). Does polygyny reduce fertility? American Journal
of Human Biology, 14, 222–232. doi:10.1002/ajhb.10045
*Kahn, A., Hottes, J., & Davis, W. L. (1971). Cooperation and optimal
responding in the prisoner’s dilemma game: Effects of sex and physical
attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 267–
279. doi:10.1037/h0030597
*Kamas, L., Preston, A., & Baum, S. (2008). Altruism in individual and
joint-giving decisions: What’s gender got to do with it? Feminist Eco-
nomics, 14, 23–50. doi:10.1080/13545700801986571
*Kanouse, D. E., & Wiest, W. M. (1967). Some factors affecting choice in
the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 206–213.
doi:10.1177/002200276701100208
Karremans, J. C., & Van Lange, P. A. M. (2004). Back to caring after being
hurt: The role of forgiveness. European Journal of Social Psychology,
34, 207–227. doi:10.1002/ejsp.192
Keeley, L. H. (1996). War before civilization: The myth of the peaceful
savage. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., & Van
Lange, P. A. M. (2003). An atlas of interpersonal situations. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kelley, H. H., & Stahelski, A. J. (1970). Social interaction basis of
cooperators’ and competitors’ beliefs about others. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 16, 66–91. doi:10.1037/h0029849
Kelly, S., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2001). Who dares wins: Heroism versus
altruism in women’s mate choice. Human Nature, 12, 89–105. doi:
10.1007/s12110-001-1018-6
*Kennelly, A., & Fantino, E. (2007). The sharing game: Fairness in
resource allocation as a function of incentive, gender, and recipient
types. Judgment and Decision Making, 2, 204–216.
Kenrick, D. T., & Keefe, R. C. (1992). Age preferences in mates reflect sex
differences in human reproductive strategies. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 15, 75–91. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00067595
Kenrick, D. T., Li, N. L., & Butner, J. (2003). Dynamical evolutionary
psychology: Individual decision rules and emergent social norms. Psy-
chological Review, 110, 3–28. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.110.1.3
Kenrick, D. T., & Luce, C. L. (2000). An evolutionary life-history model
of gender differences and similarities. In T. Eckes & H. M. Trautner
(Eds.), The developmental social psychology of gender (pp. 35–63).
Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Kenrick, D. T., Trost, M. R., & Sundie, J. M. (2004). Sex roles as
adaptations: An evolutionary perspective on gender differences and
904 BALLIET, LI, MACFARLAN, AND VAN VUGT
similarities. In A. Eagly, A. Beall, & R. Sternberg (Eds.), Psychology of
gender (pp. 65–91). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
*Kershenbaum, B. R., & Komorita, S. S. (1970). Temptation to defect in
the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 16, 110–113. doi:10.1037/h0029839
*Kiesler, S., Sproull, L., & Waters, K. (1996). A prisoner’s dilemma
experiment on cooperation with people and human-like computers.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 47–65. doi:10.1037/
0022-3514.70.1.47
*Knight, G. P. (1980). Behavioral similarity, confederate strategy, and sex
composition of dyad as determinants of interpersonal judgments and
behavior in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Research in Per-
sonality, 14, 91–103. doi:10.1016/0092-6566(80)90043-4
Knight, G. P., & Chao, C. (1989). Gender differences in the cooperative,
competitive, and individualistic social values of children. Motivation
and Emotion, 13, 125–141. doi:10.1007/BF00992958
Kollock, P. (1998). Social dilemmas: The anatomy of cooperation. Annual
Review of Sociology, 24, 183–214. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.183
*Komorita, S. S. (1965). Cooperative choice in a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 741–745. doi:10.1037/
h0022673
*Komorita, S. S., & Mechling, J. (1967). Betrayal and reconciliation in a
two-person game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6,
349–353.doi:10.1037/h0024736
Komorita, S. S., & Parks, C. D. (1994). Social dilemmas. Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Kopelman, S., Weber, J. M., & Messick, D. M. (2002). Factors influencing
cooperation in the commons dilemmas: A review of experimental psy-
chological research. In E. Ostrom, T. Dietz, N. Dolsak, P. C. Stern, S.
Stonich, & E. U. Weber (Eds.), The drama in the commons (pp. 113–
156). New York, NY: The National Academy Press.
*Kortenkamp, K. V., & Moore, C. F. (2006). Time, uncertainty, and
individual differences in decisions to cooperate in resource dilemmas.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 603–615. doi:10.1177/
0146167205284006
*Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984). Effects of group identity on
resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 46, 1044 –1057.doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.46.5.1044
Kruger, D. J., & Nesse, R. M. (2004). Sexual selection and the male:female
mortality ratio. Evolutionary Psychology, 2, 66–85.
*Kube, S., & Traxler, C. (2009). The interaction of legal and social norm
enforcement. Unpublished manuscript, Max Planck Institute for Re-
search on Collective Goods, Bonn, Germany.
*Kuhlman, D. M., & Marshello, A. F. (1975). Individual differences in
game motivation as moderators of preprogrammed strategy effects in the
prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32,
922–931.doi:10.1037/0022-3514.32.5.922
*Ku¨mmerli, R., Colliard, C., Fiechter, N., Petitpierre, B., Russier, F., &
Keller, L. (2007). Human cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparing
the snowdrift game with the prisoner’s dilemma. Proceedings of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 274, 2965–2970. doi:10.1098/
rspb.2007.0793
*Kurzban, R. (2001). The social psychophysics of cooperation: Nonverbal
communication in a public goods game. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior,
25, 241–259. doi:10.1023/A:1012563421824
*Kurzban, R., & Houser, D. (2001). Individual differences in cooperation
in a circular public goods game. European Journal of Personality, 15,
S37–S52. doi:10.1002/per.420
*Kuwabara, K. (2005). Nothing to fear but fear itself: Fear of fear, fear of
greed and gender effects in two-person asymmetric social dilemmas.
Social Forces, 84, 1257–1272. doi:10.1353/sof.2006.0020
*Lacy, W. B. (1978). Assumptions of human nature, and initial expecta-
tions and behavior as mediators of sex effects in prisoner’s dilemma
research. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 22, 269–281. doi:10.1177/
002200277802200204
LeBlanc, S., & Register, K. E. (2003). Constant battles: The myth of the
peaceful, noble savage. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.
Ledyard, J. O. (1995). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In
J. H. Kagel & A. E. Roth (Eds.), The handbook of experimental eco-
nomics (pp. 111–194). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Li, N. P., Bailey, J. M., Kenrick, D. T., & Linsenmeier, J. A. W. (2002).
The necessities and luxuries of mate preferences: Testing the tradeoffs.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 947–955. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.947
Li, N. P., Halterman, R. A., Cason, M. J., Knight, G. P., & Maner, J. K.
(2008). The stress-affiliation paradigm revisited: Do people prefer the
kindness of strangers or their attractiveness? Personality and Individual
Differences, 44, 382–391. doi:10.1016/j.paid.2007.08.017
*Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect of social motives, communication,
and group size on behavior in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive
game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14, 239–264. doi:
10.1002/ejsp.2420140302
*Liebrand, W. B. G., & Van Run, G. J. (1985). The effects of social
motives on behavior in social dilemmas in two cultures. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 86 –102. doi:10.1016/0022-
1031(85)90008-3
*Lindskold, S., Han, G., & Betz, B. (1986). Repeated persuasion in
interpersonal conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,
1183–1188. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1183
*Lindskold, S., McElwain, D. C., & Wayner, M. (1977). Cooperation and
the use of coercion by groups and individuals. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 21, 531–550. doi:10.1177/002200277702100309
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. (2001). Practical meta-analysis. London,
England: Sage.
*List, J. A. (2006). Friend or foe? A natural experiment of the prisoner’s
dilemma. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88, 463–471. doi:
10.1162/rest.88.3.463
Lovejoy, O. (2009, October 2). Reexamining human origins in light of
Ardipethecus ramidus. Science, 326, 74e1–74e8.
Low, B. S. (1989). Cross-cultural patterns in the training of children: An
evolutionary perspective. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 103,
311–319. doi:10.1037/0735-7036.103.4.311
*Lutzker, D. R. (1961). Sex role, cooperation and competition in a two-
person non-zero-sum game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 5, 366–368.
doi:10.1177/002200276100500403
Maccoby, E. E. (1990). Gender and relationships: A developmental ac-
count. American Psychologist, 45, 513–520. doi:10.1037/0003-
066X.45.4.513
Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. (1974). The psychology of sex differences.
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Maccoby, E. E., & Jacklin, C. N. (1987). Gender segregation in childhood.
In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behavior (Vol.
20, pp. 239–287). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. doi:
10.1016/S0065-2407(08)60404-8
Macfarlan, S. J., & Quinlan, R. J. (2008). Kinship, family, and gender
effects in the ultimatum game. Human Nature, 19, 294–309. doi:
10.1007/s12110-008-9045-1
*Mack, D., Auburn, P. N., & Knight, G. P. (1971). Sex role identification
and behavior in a reiterated prisoner’s dilemma game. Psychonomic
Science, 24, 280–282.
*Mack, D., Williams, J. G., & Kremer, J. M. (1979). Perception of a
simulated other player and behavior in the reiterated prisoner’s dilemma
game. The Psychological Record, 29, 43–48.
*Majolo, B., Ames, K., Brumpton, R., Garratt, R., Hall, K., & Wilson,
N. (2006). Human friendship favours cooperation in the iterated
prisoner’s dilemma. Behaviour, 143, 1383–1395. doi:10.1163/
156853906778987506
905SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
Major, B., & Adams, J. B. (1983). Role of gender, interpersonal orienta-
tion, and self-presentation in distributive-justice behavior. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 598–608. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.45.3.598
Manson, J. H., & Wrangham, R. W. (1991). Intergroup aggression in
chimpanzees and humans. Current Anthropology, 32, 369–390. doi:
10.1086/203974
Markovits, H., & Benenson, J. F. (2010). Males outperform females in
translating social relations in to spatial positions. Cognition, 117, 332–
340. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.09.006
Marlowe, F. (2004). Marital residence among foragers. Current Anthro-
pology, 45, 277–284. doi:10.1086/382256
Martell, R. F., Lane, D. M., & Emrich, C. (1996). Male–female differences:
A computer simulation. American Psychologist, 51, 157–158. doi:
10.1037/0003-066X.51.2.157
*Marwell, G., Schmitt, D. R., & Shotola, R. (1971). Cooperation and
interpersonal risk. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18,
9–32.doi:10.1037/h0030707
*Mason, C. F., Phillips, O. R., & Redington, D. B. (1991). The role of
gender in a non-cooperative game. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 15, 215–235. doi:10.1016/0167-2681(91)90030-2
Mauss, M. (1990). The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic
societies. W. D. Halls (Trans.). New York, NY: Norton. (Original work
published 1950)
*McCallum, D. M., Harring, K., Gilmore, R., Drenan, S., Chase, J. P.,
Insko, C. A., & Thibaut, J. (1985). Competition and cooperation between
groups and between individuals. Journal of Experimental Social Psy-
chology, 21, 301–320. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(85)90032-0
*McClintock, C. G., Gallo, P., & Harrison, A. A. (1965). Some effects of
variations in other strategy upon game behavior. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 1, 319–325. doi:10.1037/h0021807
*McClintock, C. G., & Liebrand, W. G. (1988). Role of interdependence
structure, individual value orientation, and another’s strategy in social
decision making: A transformational analysis. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 55, 396–409. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.55.3.396
McClintock, C. G., & McNeel, S. P. (1966). Cross-cultural comparisons of
interpersonal motives. Sociometry, 29, 406–427. doi:10.2307/2786296
McGuire, W. J., & McGuire, C. V. (1982). Significant others in self space:
Sex differences and developmental trends in social self. In J. Suls (Ed.),
Psychological perspectives on the self (pp. 71–96). Hillsdale, NJ: Erl-
baum.
*McKeown, C. D., Gahagan, J. P., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1967). The effect of
prior power strategy on behavior after a shift of power. Journal of
Experimental Research in Personality, 2, 226–233. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/615508067?accountid10978
*McNeel, S. P., McClintock, C. G., & Nuttin, J. M., Jr. (1972). Effects of
sex role in a two-person mixed-motive game. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 24, 372–380. doi:10.1037/h0033726
Mead, M. (1961). Cooperation and competition among primitive peoples.
Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
*Meeker, B. F. (1984). Cooperative orientation, trust, and reciprocity.
Human Relations, 37, 225–243. doi:10.1177/001872678403700304
*Meier, S. (2005). Conditions under which women behave less/more pro-
socially than men: Evidence from two field experiments. Unpublished
manuscript, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.
*Meux, E. P. (1973). Concern for the common good in an n-person game.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 414–418. doi:
10.1037/h0035116
*Miermin, L. S. (1976). The effects of sex and communication on perfor-
mance in a three-person mixed-motive game. Adelphi University. Pro-
Quest Dissertations and Theses. Retrieved from http://search.proquest
.com/docview/302749791?accountid10978
*Miller, G. H., & Pyke, S. W. (1973). Sex, matrix variations, and perceived
personality effects in mixed-motive games. Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, 17, 335–349. doi:10.1177/002200277301700209
*Miller, R. R. (1967). No play: A means of conflict resolution. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 6, 150–156.doi:10.1037/h0024598
*Millet, K., & Dewitte, S. (2007). Altruistic behavior as a costly signal of
general intelligence. Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 316–
326.doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2006.04.002
*Mitani, Y., & Flores, N. (2007). Does gender matter for demand revela-
tion in threshold public goods experiments? Economic Bulletin, 3, 1–7.
Moskowitz, D. S., Suh, E. J., & Desaulniers, J. (1994). Situational influ-
ences on gender differences in agency and communion. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 753–761. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.66.4.753
*Mulder, L. B. (2008). The difference between punishments and rewards in
the promotion of moral concerns in social decision making. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1436 –1443.doi:10.1016/
j.jesp.2008.06.004
*Mulder, L. B. (2010). How the presence of sanctions affects feelings of
guilt and shame. Unpublished manuscript, University of Groningen, the
Netherlands.
*Mulder, L. B., & Nelissen, R. M. A. (2010). When rules really make a
difference: The effect of cooperation rules on moral norms in social
dilemmas. Manuscript submitted for publication, University of Gro-
ningen, the Netherlands.
*Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., & De Cremer, D. (2009). When sanctions
work if there are alternative options to defect: The role of trust in leaders.
Social Influence, 4, 122–137. doi:10.1080/15534510802469156
*Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006a).
Undermining trust and cooperation: The paradox of sanctioning systems
in social dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42,
147–162. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2005.03.002
*Mulder, L. B., Van Dijk, E., De Cremer, D., & Wilke, H. A. M. (2006b).
When sanctions fail to increase cooperation in social dilemmas: Con-
sidering the presence of an alternative defection option. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 1312–1324. doi:10.1177/
0146167206289978
Mulder, M. B. (1992). Women’s strategies in polygynous marriage: Kip-
sigis, datoga, and other east African cases. Human Nature, 3, 45–70.
doi:10.1007/BF02692266
Murdock, G. P., & Wilson, S. F. (1980). Settlement patterns and commu-
nity organization: Cross-cultural codes 3. In H. Barry & A. Schlegel
(Eds.), Cross-cultural samples and codes (pp. 75–116). Pittsburgh, PA:
University of Pittsburgh Press.
*Murnighan, J. K., & Roth, A. E. (1983). Expecting continued play in
prisoner’s dilemma games: A test of several models. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 27, 279–300. doi:10.1177/0022002783027002004
Nishida, T., Corp, N., Hamai, M., Matsumoto-Oda, A., Mitani, J. C., &
Nakamura, M. (2003). Demography, female life-history, and reproduc-
tive profiles among the chimpanzees of Mahale. American Journal of
Primatology, 59, 99–121. doi:10.1002/ajp.10068
*Nowell, C., & Tinkler, S. (1994). The influence of gender on the provi-
sion of a public good. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
25, 25–36.doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90084-1
*Oberholzer-Gee, F., Waldfogel, J., & White, M. W. (2010). Friend or foe?
Cooperation and learning in high-stakes games. The Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics, 92, 179–187. doi:10.1162/rest.2009.10174
*Oda, R. (1997). Biased face recognition in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Evolution and Human Behavior, 18, 309–315. doi:10.1016/S1090-
5138(97)00014-7
*Orbell, J. M., Dawes, R., & Schwartz-Shea, P. (1994). Trust, social
categories and individuals: The case of gender. Motivation and Emotion,
18, 109–128. doi:10.1007/BF02249396
*Ortmann, A., & Tichy, L. K. (1999). Gender differences in the laboratory:
906 BALLIET, LI, MACFARLAN, AND VAN VUGT
Evidence from prisoner’s dilemma games. Journal of Economic Behav-
ior & Organization, 39, 327–339. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(99)00038-4
*Orwant, C. J., & Orwant, J. E. (1970). A comparison of interpreted and
abstract versions of mixed-motive games. Journal of Conflict Resolu-
tion, 14, 91–97. doi:10.1177/002200277001400110
*Oskamp, S., & Kleinke, C. (1970). Amount of reward in a variable in the
prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 16, 133–140. doi:10.1037/h0029840
*Oskamp, S., & Perlaman, D. (1965). Factors affecting cooperation in a
prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 9, 359–374.
doi:10.1177/002200276500900308
Oswald, D. L., Clark, E. M., & Kelly, C. M. (2004). Friendship mainte-
nance: An analysis of individual and dyad behaviors. Journal of Social
and Clinical Psychology, 23, 413–441. doi:10.1521/jscp.23.3.413.35460
Pasternak, B., Ember, C. R., & Ember, M. (1997). Sex, gender, and
kinship: A cross-cultural perspective. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
*Patterson, A. H., & Boles, W. E. (1974). The effects of personal space
variables upon approach and attitudes toward the other in a prisoner’s
dilemma game. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1, 364–366.
doi:10.1177/0146167274001001123
*Perugini, M., Tan, J., & Zizzo, D. J. (2005). Which is the more predictable
gender? Public good contribution and personality. Unpublished manu-
script, University of Essex, Clochester, United Kingdom.
Phillips, T., Barnard, C., Ferguson, E., & Reader, T. (2008). Do humans
prefer altruistic mates? Testing a link between sexual selection and
altruism towards non-relatives. British Journal of Psychology, 99, 555–
572. doi:10.1348/000712608X298467
*Pilisuk, M., Skolnick, P., & Overstreet, E. (1968). Predicting cooperation
from the two sexes in a conflict simulation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 10, 35–43.doi:10.1037/h0026310
*Poppe, M. (2005). The specificity of social dilemma situations. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 26, 431–441. doi:10.1016/j.joep.2004.12.006
*Poppe, M., & Utens, L. (1986). Effects of greed and fear of being gyped
in a social dilemma situation with changing pool size. Journal of
Economic Psychology, 7, 61–73.doi:10.1016/0167-4870(86)90012-7
Potts, M., & Hayden, T. (2008). Sex and war: How biology explains
warfare and terrorism and offers a path to a safer world. Dallas, TX:
Benbella Books.
Probst, T. M., Carnevale, P. J., & Triandis, H. C. (1999). Cultural values
in inter-group and single-group social dilemmas. Organizational Behav-
ior and Human Decision Processes, 77, 171–191. doi:10.1006/
obhd.1999.2822
*Pruitt, D. G. (1967). Reward structure and cooperation: The decomposed
prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 7, 21–27.doi:10.1037/h0024914
Pruitt, D. G. (1983). Strategic choice in negotiation. American Behavioral
Scientist, 27, 167–194. doi:10.1177/000276483027002005
Pruitt, D. G., & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental
gaming: Critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual
Review of Psychology, 28, 363–392. doi:10.1146/annurev
.ps.28.020177.002051
*Putterman, L., Tyran, J., & Kamei, K. (2010). Public goods and voting on
formal sanction schemes: An experiment. Unpublished manuscript,
Brown University, Providence, RI.
*Rapoport, A. (1988). Experiments with n-person social traps: II. Tragedy
of the commons. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 32, 473–488. doi:
10.1177/0022002788032003004
*Rapoport, A., & Chammah, A. M. (1965). Sex differences in factors
contributing to the level of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2, 831–838. doi:10.1037/
h0022678
*Reich, C., & Purbhoo, M. (1975). The effect of cross-cultural contact.
Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science/Revue canadienne des sciences
du comportement, 7, 313–327. doi:10.1037/h0081917
*Rooney, P. M., Mesch, D. J., Chin, W., & Steinbergy, K. S. (2005). The
effects of race, gender, and survey methodologies on giving in the US.
Economics Letters, 86, 173–180. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.015
*Ruffle, B. J., & Sosis, R. (2007). Does it pay to pray? Costly ritual and
cooperation. The B. E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7, 1–35.
Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovic, L. F., & Lipkus, I.
(1991). Accommodation processes in close relationships: Theory and
preliminary evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60,
53–78. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.60.1.53
Sadalla, E. K., Kenrick, D. T., & Vershure, B. (1987). Dominance and
heterosexual attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
52, 730–738. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.52.4.730
Sahlins, M. (1972). Stone age economics. New York, NY: Aldine De
Gruyter.
Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A
meta-analysis of experiments from 1958 to 1992. Rationality and Soci-
ety, 7, 58–92. doi:10.1177/1043463195007001004
Sampson, E. E., & Kardush, M. (1965). Age, sex, class, and race differ-
ences in response to a two-person non-zero-sum game. Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 9, 212–220. doi:10.1177/002200276500900207
*Sanna, L. J., Parks, C. D., & Chang, E. C. (2003). Mixed-motive conflict
in social dilemmas: Mood as input to competitive and cooperative goals.
Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice, 7, 26–40. doi:
10.1037/1089-2699.7.1.26
Schwartz, S. H., & Rubel, T. (2005). Sex differences in value priorities:
Cross-cultural and multimethod studies. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 89, 1010–1028. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.1010
Schwieren, C., & Sutter, M. (2008). Trust in cooperation or ability? An
experimental study on gender differences. Economic Letters, 99, 494–
497. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2007.09.033
*Seguino, S., Stevens, T., & Lutz, M. (1996). Gender and cooperative
behavior: Economic man rides alone. Feminist Economics, 2, 1–21.
doi:10.1080/738552683
Seielstad, M. T., Minch, E., & Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. (1998). Genetic
evidence for a higher female migration rate in humans. Nature Genetics,
20, 278–280. doi:10.1038/3088
*Sell, J. (1997). Gender, strategies, and contributions to public goods.
Social Psychology Quarterly, 60, 252–265. doi:10.2307/2787085
*Sell, J., Griffith, W. I., & Wilson, R. K. (1993). Are women more
cooperative than men in social dilemmas? Social Psychology Quarterly,
56, 211–222. doi:10.2307/2786779
Sell, J., & Kuipers, K. J. (2009). A structural social psychological view of
gender differences in cooperation. Sex Roles, 61, 317–324. doi:10.1007/
s11199-009-9597-5
*Sell, J., & Wilson, R. K. (1991). Levels of information and contributions
to public goods. Social Forces, 70, 107–124. doi:10.2307/2580064
Sellen, D. W. (1999). Polygyny and child growth in a traditional pastoral
society. Human Nature, 10, 329–371. doi:10.1007/s12110-999-1007-8
*Sermat, V. (1967). The effect of an initial cooperative or competitive
treatment upon a subject’s response to conditional cooperation. Behav-
ioral Science, 12, 301–313. doi:10.1002/bs.3830120405
*Setzman, E. J. (1974). Cooperation and competition between men and
women in a dyadic game-playing situation. Dissertation Abstracts In-
ternational, August 1974, 1109–1110.
*Sheldon, K. M. (1999). Learning lessons of tit-for-tat: Even competitors
can get the message. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
1245–1253. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.6.1245
*Sheldon, K. M., & McGregor, H. A. (2000). Extrinsic value orientation
and “the tragedy of the commons.” Journal of Personality, 68, 383–411.
doi:10.1111/1467-6494.00101
*Shinada, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2007). Punishing free riders: Direct and
907SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
indirect promotion of cooperation. Evolution and Human Behavior, 28,
330–339. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.001
*Shomer, R. W., Davis, A. H., & Kelley, H. H. (1966). Threats and the
development of coordination: Further studies of the Deutsch and Krauss
trucking game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 119–
126.doi:10.1037/h0023553
*Sibley, S., Senn, S., & Epanchin, A. (1968). Race and sex of adolescents
and cooperation in a mixed-motive game. Psychonomic Science, 13,
123–124.
Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). Social dominance: An intergroup theory
of social hierarchy and oppression. New York, NY: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Silverman, I., & Eals, M. (1992). Sex differences in spatial abilities:
Evolutionary theory and data. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby
(Eds.), The adapted mind: Evolutionary psychology and the generation
of culture (pp. 533–549). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
*Simpson, B. (2003). Sex, fear, and greed: A social dilemma analysis of
gender and cooperation. Social Forces, 82, 35–52. doi:10.1353/
sof.2003.0081
*Simpson, B., & Macy, M. W. (2004). Power, identity, and collective
action in social exchange. Social Forces, 82, 1373–1409. doi:10.1353/
sof.2004.0096
Simpson, B., & Van Vugt, M. (2009). Sex differences in cooperation:
Integrating the evolutionary and social psychological perspectives. Ad-
vances in Group Processes, 26, 81–103. doi:10.1108/S0882-
6145(2009)0000026007
*Skotko, V., Langmeyer, D., & Lundgren, D. (1974). Sex differences as
artifact in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
18, 707–713. doi:10.1177/002200277401800411
Skrypnek, B. J., & Snyder, M. (1982). On the self-perpetuating nature of
stereotypes about women and men. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 18, 277–291. doi:10.1016/0022-1031(82)90054-3
*Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2005). The devil you know: The effect
of identifiability on punishment. Journal of Behavioral Decision Mak-
ing, 18, 311–318. doi:10.1002/bdm.507
*Smith, E. R., Jackson, J. W., & Sparks, C. W. (2003). Effects of inequality
and reasons for inequality on group identification and cooperation in
social dilemmas. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 6, 201–220.
doi:10.1177/1368430203006002005
*Smith, N. S., Vernon, C. R., & Tarte, R. D. (1975). Random strategies and
sex differences in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 19, 643–650. doi:10.1177/002200277501900405
Snijders, C., & Keren, G. (2001). Do you trust? Whom do you trust? When
do you trust? Unpublished manuscript, Utrecht University, Heidelber-
glaan, the Netherlands.
Solnick, S. J. (2001). Gender differences in the ultimatum game. Economic
Inquiry, 39, 189–200. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00060.x
*Solow, J. L., & Kirkwood, N. (2002). Group identity and gender in public
goods experiments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48,
403–412. doi:10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00243-8
*Speer, D. C. (1972). Marital dysfunctionality and two-person non-zero-
sum game behavior: Cumulative monadic measures. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 21, 18–24. doi:10.1037/h0032004
*Steele, M. W., & Tedeschi, J. T. (1967). Matrix indices and strategy
choices in mixed-motive games. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11,
198–205. doi:10.1177/002200276701100207
*Stockard, J., van de Kragt, A. J. C., & Dodge, P. J. (1988). Gender roles
and behavior in social dilemmas: Are there sex differences in coopera-
tion and in its justification? Social Psychology Quarterly, 51, 154–163.
doi:10.2307/2786837
Strassmann, B. I. (1997). Polygyny as a risk factor for child mortality
among the Dogon. Current Anthropology, 38, 688–695. doi:10.1086/
204657
Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Walters, A. E. (1999). Gender differences in
negotiation outcome: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 52, 653–
677. doi:10.1111/j.1744-6570.1999.tb00175.x
*Surbey, M. K., & McNally, J. J. (1997). Self-deception as a mediator of
cooperation and defection in varying social contexts described in the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Evolution and Human Behavior, 18, 417–
435. doi:10.1016/S1090-5138(97)00090-1
Swap, W., & Rubin, J. Z. (1983). Measurement of interpersonal orienta-
tion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 208–219.doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.208
*Swingle, P. G. (1970). Exploitative behavior in non-zero-sum games.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 121–132.doi:10.1037/
h0029844
*Swope, K. J., Cadigan, J., Schmitt, P. M., & Shupp, R. (2008). Personality
preferences in laboratory economics experiments. The Journal of Socio-
Economics, 37, 998–1009. doi:10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.065
*Takahashi, C., Yamagishi, T., Tanida, S., Kiyonari, T., & Kanazawa, S.
(2006). Attractiveness and cooperation in social exchange. Evolutionary
Psychology, 4, 315–329.
*Tedeschi, J. T., Bonoma, T., & Novinson, N. (1970). Behavior of a
threatener: Retaliation vs. fixed opportunity costs. Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 14, 69–76. doi:10.1177/002200277001400108
*Tedeschi, J., Lesnick, S., & Gahagan, J. (1968). Feedback and “washout”
effects in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 10, 31–34. doi:10.1037/h0026312
*Tedeschi, J. T., Powell, J., Lindskold, S., & Gahagan, J. P. (1969). The
patterning of “honored” promises and sex differences in social conflicts.
The Journal of Social Psychology, 78, 297–298. doi:10.1080/
00224545.1969.9922375
Thayer, B. A. (2004). Darwin and international relations: On the evolu-
tionary origins of war and ethnic conflict. Lexington, KY: University
Press of Kentucky.
Thierry, B., Iwaniuk, A. N., & Pellis, S. M. (2000). The influence of
phylogeny on the social behaviour of macaques (Primates: Cercopith-
ecidae, genus Macaca). Ethology, 106, 713–728. doi:10.1046/j.1439-
0310.2000.00583.x
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (1988, April). The evolution of war and its
cognitive foundations (Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Re-
port 88-1). Paper presented at the Evolution and Human Behavior
Meetings, Ann Arbor, MI.
Twenge, J. M. (1997). Changes in masculine and feminine traits over time:
A meta-analysis. Sex Roles, 36, 305–325. doi:10.1007/BF02766650
Twenge, J. M. (2001). Changes in women’s assertiveness in response to
status and roles: A cross-temporal meta-analysis. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 81, 133–145. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.1.133
*Van Egeren, L. F. (1979). Cardiovascular changes during social compe-
tition in mixed-motive game. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 37, 858–864. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.37.6.858
*Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality
in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337–349. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.77.2.337
Van Lange, P. A. M., Bekkers, R., Schuyt, T. N. M., & Van Vugt, M.
(2007). From games to giving: Social value orientation predicts dona-
tions to noble causes. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 29, 375–
384. doi:10.1080/01973530701665223
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Joireman, J. (2008). How we can promote
behavior that serves all of us in the future. Social Issues and Policy
Review, 2, 127–157. doi:10.1111/j.1751-2409.2008.00013.x
Van Lange, P. A. M., Rusbult, C. E., Drigotas, S. M., Arriaga, X. B.,
Witcher, B. S., & Cox, C. (1997). Willingness to sacrifice in close
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1373–
1395. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.72.6.1373
Van Vugt, M. (2009). Sex differences in intergroup competition, aggres-
sion, and warfare: The male warrior hypothesis. Annals of the New York
908 BALLIET, LI, MACFARLAN, AND VAN VUGT
Academy of Sciences, 1167, 124 –134. doi:10.1111/j.1749-
6632.2009.04539.x
Van Vugt, M., & Ahuja, A. (2010). Selected: Why some people lead, why
others follow and why it matters. London, England: Profile Books.
Van Vugt, M., & De Cremer, D. (1999). Leadership in social dilemmas:
The effects of group identification on collective actions to provide public
goods. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 587–599.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.76.4.587
*Van Vugt, M., De Cremer, D., & Janssen, D. P. (2007). Gender differ-
ences in cooperation and competition: The male-warrior hypothesis.
Psychological Science, 18, 19 –23. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280
.2007.01842.x
Vigil, J. M. (2007). Asymmetries in the friendship preferences and social
styles of men and women. Human Nature, 18, 143–161. doi:10.1007/
s12110-007-9003-3
*Vinacke, W. E., Mogy, R., Powers, W., Langan, C., & Beck, R. (1974).
Accommodative strategy and communication in a three-person matrix
game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 509–525.doi:
10.1037/h0036196
*Voissem, N. H., & Sistrunk, F. (1971). Communication schedule and
cooperative game behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychol-
ogy, 19, 160–167. doi:10.1037/h0031277
Voyer, D., Postma, A., Brake, B., & Imperato-McGinley, J. (2007). Gender
differences in objection location memory: A meta-analysis. Psycho-
nomic Bulletin & Review, 14, 23–38. doi:10.3758/BF03194024
Voyer, D., Voyer, S., & Bryden, M. P. (1995). Magnitude of sex differ-
ences in spatial abilities: A meta-analysis and consideration of critical
variables. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 250–270. doi:10.1037/0033-
2909.117.2.250
Walters, A. E., Stuhlmacher, A. F., & Meyer, L. L. (1998). Gender and
negotiator competitiveness: A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, 76, 1–29. doi:10.1006/obhd.1998.2797
Watts, D. P. (1996). Comparative socio-ecology of gorillas. In W. C.
McGrew, L. F. Marchant, & T. Nishida (Eds.), Great ape societies (pp.
16–28). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Weber, J. M., Kopelman, S., & Messick, D. M. (2004). A conceptual
review of decision-making in social dilemmas: Applying a logic of
appropriateness. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 8, 281–307.
doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0803_4
Whitesell, N. R., & Harter, S. (1996). The interpersonal context of emo-
tion: Anger with close friends and classmates. Child Development, 67,
1345–1359. doi:10.2307/1131704
Whyte, M. K. (1978). The status of women in preindustrial societies.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wilder, J. A., Kingan, S. B., Mobasher, Z., Pilkington, M. M., & Hammer,
M. F. (2004). Global patterns of human mitochondrial DNA and
Y-chromosome structure are not influenced by higher migration rates of
females versus males. Nature Genetics, 36, 1122–1125. doi:10.1038/
ng1428
*Wiley, M. G. (1968). Sex differences in cooperation and competition (Un-
published doctoral dissertation). Vanderbulit University, Nashville, TN.
*Wiley, M. G. (1973). Sex roles in games. Sociometry, 36, 526–541.
doi:10.2307/2786248
*Willer, R. (2009). Groups reward individual sacrifice: The status of
solution to the collective action problem. American Sociological Review,
74, 23–43. doi:10.1177/000312240907400102
Wilson, J. F., Weiss, D. A., Richards, M., Thomas, M. G., Bradman, N., &
Goldstein, G. B. (2001). Genetic evidence for different male and female
roles during cultural transitions in the British Isles. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Science, USA, 98, 5078 –5083. doi:10.1073/
pnas.071036898
*Wit, A. P., & Kerr, N. L. (2002). “Me versus just us versus us all”
categorization and cooperation in nested social dilemmas. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 616–637. doi:10.1037/0022-
3514.83.3.616
*Wit, A., & Wilke, H. (1992). The effect of social categorization on
cooperation in three types of social dilemmas. Journal of Economic
Psychology, 13, 135–151. doi:10.1016/0167-4870(92)90056-D
*Wit, A., & Wilke, H. (1998). Public good provision under environmental
and social uncertainty. European Journal of Social Psychology, 28,
249 –256. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199803/04)28:2249::AID-
EJSP8683.0.CO;2-J
Witt, M. G., & Wood, W. (2010). Self-regulation of gendered behavior in
everyday life. Sex Roles, 62, 635–646. doi:10.1007/s11199-010-9761-y
Wood, W., & Eagly, A. H. (2002). A cross-cultural analysis of the behavior
of women and men: Implications for the origins of sex differences.
Psychological Bulletin, 128, 699 –727. doi:10.1037/0033-2909
.128.5.699
Wood, W., & Eagly, A. H. (2010). Gender. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert,
& G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp.
629–667). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Wrangham, R. W. (1999). Evolution of coalitionary killing [Supplement:
Yearbook of physical anthropology]. American Journal of Physical Anthro-
pology, 110, 1–30. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1096-8644(1999)110:29
1::AID-AJPA23.0.CO;2-E
Wrangham, R. W., & Peterson, D. (1996). Demonic males. New York, NY:
Houghton Mifflin Company.
*Yamagishi, T. (1986). The provision of a sanctioning system as a public
good. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 110–116.
doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110
*Yamagishi, T., Foddy, M., Matsuda, M., Kiyonari, T., & Platow, M. J.
(2005). Comparisons of Australians and Japanese on group-based coop-
eration. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 8, 173–190. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-839x.2005.00165.x
*Yamagishi, T., & Mifune, N. (2009). Social exchange and solidarity:
In-group love or out-group hate? Evolution and Human Behavior, 30,
229–237.doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.02.004
*Yamagishi, T., Terai, S., Kiyonari, T., Mifune, N., & Kanazawa, S.
(2007). The social exchange heuristic: Managing errors in social ex-
change. Rationality and Society, 19, 259 –291. doi:10.1177/
1043463107080449
Yuki, M., & Yakota, K. (2009). The primal warrior: Outgroup threat
priming enhances intergroup discrimination in men but not women.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45, 271–274.
Received February 25, 2010
Revision received July 22, 2011
Accepted July 28, 2011 
909SEX DIFFERENCES IN COOPERATION
